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Yordanov Views Visits by Balkan Leaders

AU0505115794 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 29 Apr 94 pp 1, 4

[Interview with National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov by Valeriya Veleva; place and date not given: "No Translator Was Needed When I Talked to Gligorov"]

[Veleva] Mr. Yordanov, in his speech to the Bulgarian parliament Albanian President Sali Berisha called Serbia a source of "war, conflicts, instability, and aggression" in the Balkans. How would this be accepted in diplomatic circles?

[Yordanov] I am sure Mr. Berisha's speech will be read carefully both in Athens and Belgrade. This is normal. Regardless of how his speech is accepted in various countries, one cannot deny the sincerity and openness of his position. I have a high regard for the speech, because it named clearly, and I would say in a nondiplomatic manner, some of the greatest dangers in our region. By this I mean the communist heritage, imperial ambitions, and radical nationalism. These are Balkan illnesses. It is much easier to heal an illness when you have diagnosed it. In this sense Berisha, who is a noted politician who has made a great contribution to the democratic reforms in Albania, met with understanding in the National Assembly.

[Veleva] Do you share Berisha's position on the situation in the Balkans and the danger of the Yugo-conflict expanding to the south?

[Yordanov] I have always stressed that the war in former Yugoslavia is a result of several factors: traditional nationalism, xenophobia, and ethnic intolerance—a sinister remnant from the past which was activated very much in the postcommunist situation. We should also not forget the very legacy of the communist way of thinking that remains in many people and politicians. In addition, democratic changes are taking place very slowly in former Yugoslavia, where communist structures and the former communist leaders continue to dominate. This by itself represents a danger. One should not forget who first started the war. It is a result of the Serbian striving to expand their territory. Sometimes people in Bulgaria forget this historical fact, which must be remembered.

I expect that in the near future formulas for resolving the Balkan crisis will be found and Bulgaria will be the state that will best defend the European principles and values. The more quickly we integrate our country in the European economic and parliamentary structures and the closer our relations with NATO become, the more Bulgaria will be a peaceful, secure, stable, and prosperous state. This will be its contribution to the all-European process.

[Veleva] Do you think that events around 17 May, when the Turkish "Blue Helmets" head for Bosnia-Herzegovina, will again stir the Bulgarian parliament?

[Yordanov] I do not divide the Blue Helmets up into Turkish, American, Russian, and Finnish. A soldier with a blue helmet is a symbol of peace and understanding. However, we have repeatedly warned that the presence of precisely Turkish Blue Helmets could have a destructive role in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where nationalism is very strong. Whoever speaks against Turkey serves a non-Bulgarian and non-European policy. However, since the conflict in Yugoslavia was created on the basis of the continuing nationalism, there is the danger that the appearances of precisely Turkish soldiers with blue helmets could activate nationalism and prompt historical associations. In this context during the visit of Mr. Cindoruk I repeatedly stressed that from the point of view of the existing complexes related to the Balkan nations' nationalism, the presence of Turkish blue helmets in the conflict region is undesirable. However, let us not forget that they were called to Bosnia- Herzegovina not by the Turkish Government, but by the United Nations. Subsequently, our position is that the United Nations should take closer note of historical and specific realities when it sends troops from a certain country.

[Veleva] Mr. Yordanov, do you not have the feeling that we are being slowly dragged into the conflict?

[Yordanov] I would not say that. The European and world communities are simply looking for ways to resolve the conflict. If we begin to think that the world wants to create a war in the Balkans, it would encourage an exceptionally populist and provincial attitude in our country. This is a provincial policy that could be discussed in street taverns. However, this is not the way one should be thinking at the end of the 20th century. If it is true that the world is so evil that it wants to kindle new conflicts, and that the major statesmen are such monsters, then there is no hope for the world! How could we oppose this? Obviously, we must believe, and I absolutely do believe, that the efforts of the United Nations, the EC, the United States, Russia, and all Balkan countries must be directed precisely toward resolving the conflict. Real steps have already been adopted to try to stop the conflict, and there have been real achievements.

[Veleva] Did Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] not strain our relations with Greece? What can we expect from the upcoming visit of the leader of "New Democracy" to our country?

[Yordanov] I do not think so. Greece's policy is clearly oriented toward Europe. The Greeks have reason to express certain concerns. Some articles of the Macedonian Constitution really do not correspond to the principles that are characteristic of the member-states of the Council of Europe. There are no outstanding problems between Bulgaria and Greece, and it is impossible for our relations to be strained. These relations are founded on principles that have a noble place in our historical memories. It is a fact that we view Greece as a country through which we really could come closer to the European structures.

[Veleva] Upon his return to Macedonia Kiro Gligorov said that Bulgaria must walk its share of the road toward recognizing the so-called "Macedonian" language, in which the Macedonian literature supposedly is written. Do you think that the future will see a "Macedonian" nation and language?

[Yordanov] I cannot make any forecasts, but when I talked with Gligorov there was no need for a translator. In fact, the translator only created a noise. I think Gligorov understood absolutely everything I said without any translation. As far as the "Macedonian" language is concerned, I have examined this issue and studied the activity of the Miladinov brothers [noted Bulgarian culture and history researches in the first half of the 19th century], and share the opinion of Bulgarian science. Therefore I categorically supported the position that the expression "in the official languages of the two countries" should be included in the documents that were supposed to be signed. Since the official languages are determined by the appropriate articles of the Constitutions, there were no obstacles to signing important documents, except emotional reasons of a domestic political nature. I am convinced that sooner or later these language and emotional problems related to the interpretation if history will be eliminated, because they do not have an important part in feeding the people! Interests of economic, trade, and purely humane character will become ever more important. The border that exists between Bulgaria and Macedonia will separate us less and less, and unite us more and more. When this border becomes a border of rapprochement, it will suddenly become clear that we speak the same language.

Cabinet Denies KNSB Charge of Phone Taps

AU0305172694 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 3 May 94

[Text] The Council of Ministers Press Center issued a statement today in connection with the statement that Professor Krustyu Petkov made today at a news conference of the KNSB [Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria] in which he claimed that the telephones of the trade unions that are preparing to conduct national protest actions on 4 May are tapped. The statement denies the KNSB claim. In its own announcement, the Interior Ministry Press Center points out such actions are not allowed, as they would violate the Law on Special Intelligence-Gathering Devices.

Arrests Reported During KNSB 'Warning' Strike

AU0405174194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 4 May 94

[Report by correspondent Varshava Maksimova]

[Text] According to information received from the National Strike Committee of the KNSB [Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria], 844,599 people took part in today's national warning strike, while 641,392 people took one-hour effective strike action. Protest rallies were held at more than half the enterprises in the country. Members of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, the Association of Democratic Trade Unions, and the National Trade Union, as well as private drivers, also took part in the protests.

In Plovdiv the city authorities banned the planned rally, as a result of which health workers took part in a silent march along several of the city's central streets. Over 30 organizations in the road transportation sector took part in the strike, stopping work for periods varying from 15 to 60 minutes.

The following main roads were blocked for one hour: the Sofia-Svilengrad road near Khaskovo; the Burgas-Sofia road at Aytos; the Sofia-Kulata route at Dupnitsa; the Ruse-Silistra road near Slivo Pole. The Varna-Burgas road was blocked for 20 minutes near the village of Kosharitsa. In Svishtov dockers blocked the river port for one hour, while the Danube Bridge was closed in both directions for one hour.

According to the KNSB National Strike Committee, the police arrested four trade union leaders today when they attempted to block the Burgas-Varna main road. Those detained included KNSB Executive Secretary Doncho Donchev. Three trade union leaders from Dupnitsa were also arrested. The National Strike Committee delivered a sharp protest against these police actions and stated in an official announcement that this step might lead to a new escalation of the strike conflict. The KNSB will immediately inform the European Trade Union Confederation, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and the Council of Europe of these violations of the Social Charter and European conventions. The same institutions will also receive reports on the action taken to prevent workers from two commercial enterprises holding a rally in front of the Council of Ministers building in Sofia.

In connection with these statements issued by the KNSB National Strike Committee, the Interior Ministry Press Center disseminated an announcement that rejects these claims outright. According to the Interior Ministry announcement, the attempts to block the road in the region of Slunchev Bryag and the main road near Dupnitsa represented offenses against the Road Traffic Act, as a result of which the police filed charges against the drivers involved. The statement notes that no force or special equipment was used. Regarding the rally outside the Council of Ministers building, the announcement states that the participants were informed by law-enforcement agences that no permit for the rally had been issued, following which they quietly dispersed without any incident.

After teachers and kindergarten assistants in boarding schools and children's and orphans homes had stopped work for one hour, at 1600 today the National Strike Committee of the Bulgarian Teachers Union signed a strike agreement with the Ministry of Education and Science that partially satisfies the teachers' demands.

Protest by Firms Involved in Land Reform

AU0405191994 Sofia Bulgarska Televiziya Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] It is now the third day since the companies engaged in the division of farmland suspended work on restoring the land to its owners. They will continue their action until the Agriculture and Finance Ministries, the government, and parliament examine their problems and make official decisions on them. Today representatives from companies all over the country held a protest march.

[Unidentified correspondent] The march began with a rally held in front of the Agriculture Ministry. The protesters believe that our country lacks the political will to resolve the problems of the land reform. For almost one month, their attempts to hold negotiations with the institutions responsible have been postponed with the excuse that the prime minister was ill and ministers were abroad.

[Unidentified protester] Our first demand is that the contracts should be fulfilled and payments made on time, so that the small companies can cover their costs. Second, we demand that the contract prices should be indexed; they have not been indexed in line with inflation since 1992 so, owing to rising inflation, it is impossible to meet the costs of the land reform. The firms involved in land division do not oppose value-added tax, because they know that this is the best way to provide revenue for the budget, but they want the Agriculture Ministry to pay the money that is due to the taxation authorities, as the law provides.

[Correspondent] After Agriculture Minister Georgi Tanev refused to receive the protesters, they set off to the Council of Ministers and National Assembly, where they handed over their declarations.

Karabashev Explains Resignation Circumstances

AU0505130794 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 29 Apr 94

[Interview with former Deputy Prime Minister Valentin Karabashev by Venelina Gocheva and Khristofor Karadzhov; place and date not given: "Berov Stopped Privatization"]

[Excerpts] [24 CHASA] Mr. Karabashev, you decided to act ahead of the prime minister and resigned before he kicked you out.

[Karabashev] I think that such a move is normal. Since the prime minister stated in front of the National Assembly and the people that he was dissatisfied with my work as minister of trade and deputy prime minister, he should have replaced me already on 27 April. It was abnormal not to do it. Since I adhere to normal things, I resigned.

I intended to do it already last week because of differences with the prime minister, including on the issue of reshuffling the cabinet. However, I decided to wait a bit longer, because I hoped to reach a compromise.

[24 CHASA] What was it that you did not like in the proposed reshuffling?

[Karabashev] Initially, I was offered the posts of deputy prime minister or a minister without portfolio, without precisely determined functions. From the conversation with Professor Berov I did not understand what precisely I would be responsible for. Mainly from other people I also understood that he himself did not know this. Apparently, it was not the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] that changed its attitude toward me, but rather that he simply did not have an alternative candidate for my post. [passage omitted]

[24 CHASA] Was not the fact that Mr. Matinchev was appointed acting prime minister the reason for the cooling of your relations with the prime minister?

[Karabashev] This act indicated a certain lack of confidence in me, and in the final analysis this was confirmed by the proposals for reshuffling the cabinet.

[24 CHASA] All right, what are the differences between you and the prime minister?

[Karabashev] We differ on the Law on Privatization and the privatization process itself. There also were serious differences during the preparation and the adoption of the regulations on the state participation in the privatization and the related functions of the Privatization Agency. If you recall, there were great differences during the preparation of the documents related to establishing the Interdepartmental Council on the Military- Industrial Complex. The supradepartmental organ that was proposed then contradicted the constitution. In the final analysis, the proposal was rejected after I and Minister Bikov objected. You could also recall the disputes regarding the adoption of the so-called privatization list for 1994, which although it had no legal value, inflicted a severe blow on the privatization process.

Contrary to Prof. Berov, who said in the parliament that I am the reason for the fact that there is no privatization, I maintain that he is the cause. This is related to his desire to replace the market privatization by a mass privatization already during the first days of his tenure. [passage omitted]

[24 CHASA] With your resignation from the parliament [as published] the Alternative Social Liberal Party [ASP] ceases to be a ruling party.

[Karabashev] It was not a ruling party anyway, because my influence in the cabinet was rather weak.

[24 CHASA] Do you know what President Zhelev thinks about your resignation?

[Karabashev] I talked to President Zhelev prior to my resignation....

[24 CHASA] Did he try to dissuade you?

[Karabashev] No.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Arrives on Visit

AU0305172894 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 3 May 94

[Text] I am very pleased to have the opportunity to visit Bulgaria, something that I have wanted to do for a long time, said Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Abdullah Alatas upon his arrival. During his meetings in Sofia he will mainly discuss issues connected with developing economic contacts, because no controversial problems exist in political relations between Bulgaria and Indonesia.

Received by President Zhelev

AU0405093794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 4 Apr 94

[Text] On 4 May President Zhelyu Zhelev received Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas,, who is on an official visit to Bulgaria. Presidential Spokesman Valentin Stoyanov reports on the main topics discussed during the talk:

[Begin Stoyanov recording] There are no political differences between the two countries. This is a prerequisite for intensifying relations between the two countries, especially in the trade and economic sphere. We hope that this will be achieved.

President Zhelev asked Alatas to influence the Islamic Conference Organization to drop the Bulgarian Turks issue from its agenda. This issue has been on the organization's agenda for several years already. This is a a total anachronism, because the rights of the Bulgarian Turks have been fully restored. They are among the members of the parliament and in the organs of the municipal power, and it appears that the whole issue is now obsolete.

Alatas promised to raise the issue during the organization's next session in Tunisia, because, according to him, the organization has other more important issues that it must resolve. [end recording]

Alatas Supports Dividing Bosnia

AU0405143594 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] My visit was a result of very important and specific changes in both our countries, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said at a news conference today prior to his departure. He pointed out that in addition to developing trade and economic relations, the two countries must seek together third markets in their regions, the Balkans and the Far East.

Regarding the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the guest said that the ethnic basis of the conflict must not be ignored and that Indonesia supports dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic parts—provided it is done in a just way and in accordance with the country's independence.

Opposition Obstructs Parliament's Work

AU0405201094 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 30 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Stefan Hrcka: "Deputies 'On Strike' Again; Parliament Passed Environmental Impact Assessment Law"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—As on 28 April, yesterday opposition deputies went "on strike" again and boycotted the vote on supplementing the Slovak Television Council. Because even some coalition deputies were not present in parliament, the legislative body did not have a quorum. Ludovit Cernak (National Democratic Party-New Alternative), who chaired the session, therefore declared yesterday's third day of the 30th meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic closed at noon, shortly after 1200.

At the outset of yesterday's session, before 0930, the deputies started discussing the government-sponsored draft law on environmental impact assessment, which has been in preparation for over two years. In putting forward the bill, Minister of Environment Juraj Hrasko stressed that it is fully compatible with comparable legislation in member countries of the European Union and other economically advanced countries of the world. [passage omitted] Parliament approved the bill with the proviso that it will go into effect on 1 July 1994. [passage omitted]

The National Council then approved, for the second time, the amendment to the law on arbitration proceedings in international trade relations and the execution of arbitration decisions, which had been returned to parliament by the president. The amendment, which will go into effect on 1 June 1994, changes the name of the law and extends its applicability to domestic trade, as well. The deputies then elected Frantisek Javorsky (Christian Democratic Movement) as member of the special parliamentary body for supervising the activity of the Slovak Information Service. (He replaces Ladislav Pittner, who has become the minister of the interior.) Parliament also acknowledged the resignation of Peter Papan from the Slovak Television Council. A secret vote was held, in which parliament was to elect three new members of the Slovak Television Council to replace members who resigned. The vote was invalid, however, because only 65 deputies participated in it and not the required 50 percent plus one majority of deputies. [passage omitted] Ludovit Cernak therefore declared the deliberations closed. He also said that parliament did not have a quorum because deputies for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Slovak National Party did not present themselves, even though they were present. The parliament meeting will continue on Wednesday [4 May].

HZDS Protests Austrian Election 'Interference'

AU0405152294 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 30 Apr 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "Allegedly Mendacious Defamations"]

[Text] Bratislava—Referring to the Slovak press, the Austrian APA agency yesterday reported that Anna Nagyova, former director of the Slovak prime minister's secretariat, was expecting a baby by former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. In addition to this information, the APA report also contains several invectives regarding their "supposedly not merely official business relations" and marital problems in both families. A statement made available to TA SR yesterday by Ondrej Hanko, spokesman for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], notes in this context that, "by its vulgar, unsubstantiated, and mendacious contents, the APA report defames HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar and Anna Nagyova, head of his secretariat." In the name of the HZDS, Hanko openly asked Austrian President Thomas Klestil, Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, and Parliament Chairman Heinz Fischer how they assess the fact that, "before the early elections, Austrian media are interfering grossly and in the dirtiest possible way in the election campaign by their unfounded scandalization of a leading politician, the chairman of the largest political entity in neighboring Slovakia." He asks whether this does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of a neighboring country and in the hitherto exemplary friendly relations, which have been successfully developed by Meciar personally. HZDS representatives also sent a similar statement to leading Austrian dailies.

Cabinet Cedes Czech-Inhabited Settlement

LD0505104794 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0500 GMT 5 May 94

[Text] At its most recent session, the Slovak Government decided to abolish the former Cabinet resolution refusing any alteration of the border with the Czech Republic. It thus accepts the original proposal of the two countries' interior ministers, who agreed to exchange the Czech settlement of U Sabotu in the village of Javornik for a part of Slovak Sidonia near Brumov-Bylnice, Zlin district. Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus said the following after the government session:

[Begin Klaus recording] We know about the Slovak Government's decision only from the communications media. I asked the interior minister to discover precisely the definitive meaning, shape, manner, and form of this decision. We would not like to do anything hasty on the basis of a very terse report in the media.

Naturally, if this could untangle the unsatisfactory story of still-to-be-resolved border problems, we would be very glad, but let us see the decision of the Slovak Government. [end recording]

April Polling Results Reported

On Most-Trusted Politicians

AU0405143794 Bratislava SME in Slovak 23 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by "SME-r": "Trust in Politicians in Slovakia in April 1994"]

[Text] Bratislava—In a public opinion poll surveying trust in individual personalities of political life in Slovakia that the Slovak Statistical Office carried out on 1 to 8 April 1994, 1,287 respondents above age 18 were asked to reply to the question: "Which politician operating in the Slovak Republic at present enjoys your trust?" Each respondent was able to cite three personalities. The mosaic of trustworthy politician was made up of 70 names, 11 of whom received more than 3 percent. The poll revealed another decline (by 18 percent since February) in the group of those who do not trust anyone.

Vladimir Meciar enjoys trust among Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] sympathizers (83 percent) and Slovak National Party [SNS] sympathizers (39 percent); Jozef Moravcik among Bratislava residents (48 percent), Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] sympathizers (37 percent), Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] sympathizers (40 percent), Alternative of Political Realism [APR] sympathizers (76 percent), respondents with complete secondary education (30 percent) and university education (35 percent), as well as among white-collar workers (32 percent). President Michal Kovac is trusted by SDL sympathizers (30 percent), KDH sympathizers (43 percent), APR sympathizers (45 percent), citizens of Hungarian nationality (44 percent), and respondents with university education (33 percent).

Trust in Representatives of Political Life in Slovakia, as Expressed by Citizens in Apr 1994 (in percent)

	Feb 1994	Mar 1994	Apr 1994
Vladimir Meciar	22	25	26
Jozef Moravcik	5	5	25
Michal Kovac	20	25	25
Peter Weiss	15	16	13
Ivan Gasparovic	8	7	10
Roman Kovac	5	3	7
Jozef Prokes	5	5	5
Jan Carnogursky	5	6	4
Rudolf Filkus	1	1	4
Ludovit Cernak	3	4	3
Bela Bugar	2	3	3
Does not trust any politician	43	31	25

Note: Table lists only the names of those politicians who were trusted by at least 3 percent in April 1994. Because of the possibility of naming three personalities, the total exceeds 100 percent.

On Party Preferences

AU0405120294 Bratislava SME in Slovak 22 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by "SME-r": "Electoral Decisions of Slovak Republic Citizens Who Would Definitely or Probably Participate in Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic If They Were To Be Held Today"]

[Text] Bratislava—In the first 10 days of April 1994, the Slovak Statistical Office [SU SR] carried out its regular monthly public opinion research. The sample (1,287 respondents) was formed so as to correspond to the composition of the adult population of the Slovak Republic in terms of sex, age, nationality, level of education, size of community of residence, and region.

The data acquired in the research suggests that citizens' interest in participating in the early parliamentary elections increased during the past month. Whereas in March 72 percent of eligible voters said that they would definitely or probably participate in the elections, their proportion in April was 76 percent.

The greatest difference between individual regions of Slovakia as regards participation in the elections is between Central Slovakia, where 74 percent of those questioned said that they would definitely or probably participate in the elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], and Bratislava, where 86 percent of respondents declared their interest in going to the polls. Asked which political party or movement they would vote for, those adult citizens of Slovakia who would definitely or probably participate in the elections replied most frequently that they would cast their vote for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS].

The most striking changes compared with the preelection situation in early March concern precisely this movement, which has strengthened its leading position since the last poll. At the same time, it increased its lead over the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], which holds second place in the distribution of current electoral preferences.

Differences among individual regions of Slovakia regarding the estimated electoral gains of relevant political forces are not statistically significant in the case of the SDL, the Alternative of Political Realism [APR], the Slovak National Party [SNS], the Democratic Party [DS], and the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS]. As far as the HZDS is concerned, support for the movement in Central Slovakia is higher than in all other regions. Characteristic of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] over the long term is its relatively numerous electoral base in East Slovakia. In view of the fact that approximately two-thirds of citizens declaring themselves of Hungarian nationality will give their votes to Hungarian political parties, the estimated electoral results of the coalition partners Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] ar_ Coexistence in individual regions of the Slovak Republic depend to a decisive degree on the representation of ethnic Hungarians in the region in question.

	March 1994	April 1994
HZDS	24	32
SDL	14	13
KDH	8	8
Coexistence/MKDH	9	7
APR	—	7
SNS	5	4
DS	4	3
SDSS	2	3
Green Party of Slovakia	3	2
Association of Workers of Slovakia	—	2
Alliance of Democrats	3	2
National Democratic Party-New Alternative [NDS-NA]	—	2
Other parties	15	3
Do not know for whom they will vote	13	12

Note: Data in percent

Source: SU SR—Public Opinion Research

Electoral preferences are cited only for those political entities that would receive in April at least 1.5 percent of the vote of adult citizens of the Slovak Republic who are either determined to vote or will probably vote. The APR and the NDS-NA did not operate as independent political entities at the time of the March poll (2-10 March), while the Association of Workers of Slovakia had not yet declared itself a political entity.

Report on 1993 Currency Development Approved

LD0405190094 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] The bank council of the National Bank of Slovakia discussed and approved today a report on 1993 currency development in Slovakia. The council has authorized Vladimir Masar, the bank's governor, to submit the report to the National Council. The bank council has stated that the priorities of the currency program have been successfully carried out, the price increases were kept at a minimum, and the internal convertibility of the Slovak koruna was maintained. The current account for the balance of payments ended in 1993 with a negative balance of $559 million, while the overall balance ended in a positive balance of $58.5 million.

ΩCommentaries Expect Socialist Party Victory

94P20701A

[Editorial Report] Commentaries appearing in mid-April on the editorial pages of three Budapest journals with different political orientations all indicated that the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), successor to the former ruling Communist Party's reformist wing, is likely to win the parliamentary election in the two rounds of voting on 8 and 29 May. The consensus is apparently so widespread that even a supporter of the present right-of-center coalition, PESTI HIRLAP, in a 14 April commentary by Ferenc Sinkovics, admitted that "every day it becomes unequivocally clearer: The MSZP will win the election." Most of Sinkovics's commentary was devoted to predicting the problems an MSZP government would face. Noting that the communist system collapsed irrevocably and cannot be reinstated, especially since there is no longer any "Big Brother" behind it, Sinkovics asserted that the MSZP will be "forced to accept building a market economy" and will lose support when it becomes clear that it is no more successful than the present government in lowering prices—which, to Hungarian voters, "is more important than any principle or ideology." Noting that Hungary may follow the example of Poland, where society became "disappointed and impatient" with the leftist government "in a few months" when it failed to improve the economy, Sinkovics noted that "we cannot be sure that the socialist government will last" until the next scheduled election in 1998.

Although more ambiguous than the PESTI HIRLAP piece, an editorial commentary by Istvan Csurka—who was expelled last fall for his far right views from the more centrist Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the leading party of the present government—also indicated that the MSZP is likely to win the election. In an editorial published on 21 April in his weekly MAGYAR FORUM, Csurka chastized the MDF for its "arrogant refusal" to accept the proposal of his party, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), that they and the other "national" parties—the Christian Democratic People's Party and the Independent Smallholders Party—form a coalition against the left. Unless the moderate right and far right agree to cooperate, Csurka asserted, the MSZP will be in a position to "choose its own coalition," most likely forming a government with the main liberal party, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). The only outcome that would be "even worse" than an MSZP-SZDSZ government would be a coalition of the MDF, the Christian Democrats, the Smallholders and the liberals, in which the "national forces" would be a mere "meaningless decoration," Csurka wrote. The MIEP would not join such a coalition under any circumstances, Csurka declared.

Arguing that the election must not be allowed to become a "duel" between the right and left, Ferenc Pallagi in the 14 April issue of the trade union daily NEPSZAVA urged liberals to unite and present a viable alternative both to the present right-of-center government and to the socialists, "whose popularity has grown incredibly in recent months." If the two main liberal parties—SZDSZ and the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz)—do not cooperate more effectively, Pallagi said, the "liberal center" will "disappear," leaving only the left and right. Of these, the left has the "bigger possibility" of winning, for there is "little chance" that voters will support the parties of the present government, of which the public is "visibly more afraid," Pallagi argued, "than of the reddest left." Thus, he suggested, unless the liberals regain momentum, the left will get a commanding lead in the election. "And, having won by too much, the Socialist Party will have a hard time trying to form a government," Pallagi said, because no prospective coalition partner will want to lend its "name and political prestige" to a government that "it will hardly be able to influence." It is possible, however, that the left's victory will be so great that it will be able to govern alone, "without any control"—a prospect, according to Pallagi, that may be "just as repellent" as the "right-wing rule" of the present government.

Railway Workers Join Strike in Silesia

LD0505090094 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0800 GMT 5 May 94

[Excerpts] Strikes in the Silesia region are spreading. The Solidarity Slasko-Dabrowski regional chairman said today that railway workers have joined the strike. Strikes began this morning at Bytom, Radzionkow, Brynow, Lisow, Kochanowice, Herby Stare, and Krupski Mlyn stations. Railway workers from Lubliniec joined the strike at 0700. The strikers have stopped servicing cargo trains and train engines, a communique says. The length of the strike depends on a decision of the Solidarity national strike headquarters. Railway workers have presented a list of demands that are similar to the trade union's national demands. [passage omitted]

Miners are also on strike. According to trade unionists, the strike continues in 22 hard-coal mines. The State Hard Coal Agency in Katowice confirmed that coal is not being mined in 20 collieries. Miners from three zinc and lead mines are also on strike.

Foreign Ministry on Israeli-PLO Accord

LD0405201694 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1730 GMT 4 May 94

["Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Republic on the Occasion of the Israel-PLO Accord"—PAP headline]

[Text] Warsaw, 4 May—The Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] of the Polish Republic welcomes with satisfaction the signing of an accord between Israel and the PLO, which determines the manner for the introduction of temporary Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, the MSZ statement sent to PAP on the 4th of this month reads.

The concluded agreement is, following the signing in Washington on 13 September 1993 of the declaration of principles for the Palestinian temporary autonomy, yet another historic document regulating the relations between both nations on principles of peaceful coexistence, dialogue, and cooperation. It is an important step toward the creation of multilateral, stable, and just peace in that part of the world. It strengthens the conviction that, even the most difficult problems and conflicts of the contemporary world may and must be resolved in the spirit of mutual tolerance and readiness for compromise, the statement reads.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses the conviction that both sides will continue their efforts toward the peaceful solution of all of the complex aspects of their mutual relations and toward the creation of a durable base for coexistence of both nations.

Confirming the readiness to support the efforts toward the establishment of durable peace and security in the Middle East in cooperation with the international community, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Republic wishes at the same time to express Poland's resolve for further development of cooperation with all of the states and nations in that part of the world, the MSZ statement reads.

Ukraine's General Staff Chief Visits Poland

WS0405140294 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 4 May 94 p 2

[Article by M.J.: "Ukraine's General Staff Head in Poland"]

[Text] At the invitation of General Tadeusz Wilecki, head of the General Staff of the Polish Army, on 4 May General Anatoli Vasilievich Lopata, head of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, will visit Poland. The Ukrainian commander is accompanied by a group of high-ranking officers representing, among others, the air defense forces, communication forces, and logistics services.

The visit is an important element of developing military contacts between both armies. During their visit to our country, the Ukrainian delegation will be received by National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk; it will also hold working talks in the General Staff of the Polish Army. It is expected that such problems as technical cooperation and issues related to the "Partnership for Peace" program will be discussed.

In line with the program of their stay in Poland, the Ukrainian guests will also become familiar with the scientific achievements of the Military Technical Academy, will listen to the observations of the marine servicemen of the Third Flotilla of Ships, and will visit the Higher Air Force Officers School in Deblin.

The delegation of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will also place a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

Sejm Deputy Assails Walesa's Conduct

PM0505082394 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 27 Apr 94 p 7

[Interview with Sejm Deputy Wojciech Lamentowicz, political analyst and Union of Labor activist, by correspondent Wojciech Gielzynski; place and date not given]

[Text] [Gielzynski] The president's strategic objective is quite clear: a second term of office, to be spent in the two palaces [the Belweder and the Namiestnikowski Palace]. It is more difficult to assess the president's recent vigorous moves. Is he regaining his good form, or is he becoming nervous?

[Lamentowicz] These moves were ineffective from the viewpoint of his objectives, and they also demonstrated that he could be a possible factor in Poland's destabilization. The president is throwing a monkey wrench into the works of a moving vehicle. He is trying to interfere with the progress of forces he can no longer control. And

so he is losing. Those among the public who understand what is going on see his behavior as desperate attempts to halt processes that are unfavorable from the viewpoint of Walesa's personal goals: another term in office as president. He makes these attempts using increasingly dramatic methods and resorting to very poor style. His image is increasingly that of an ineffectual and tragicomic politician because he cannot understand that he is losing and behaves as if he were winning.

[Gielzynski] But, recently, he seems to have regained a part of his old support force—that is, Solidarity.

[Lamentowicz] I do not think so. Walesa has distanced himself from most of the political groups hailing originally from Solidarity, and they are no longer able to vote for him. To begin with, he antagonized the center groups and the Democratic Union, and then he declared war on the right wing's "useless duds." In turn, the Union of Labor has never felt inclined to cultivate close relations with him. Ours is the only political group that has never sent him birthday wishes in any form. We decided that the president's birthday is his private affair and pointed out that he does not send us birthday greetings, either. Moreover, ours is the only group that did not take part in the ceremonial signing of the concordat agreement.

[Gielzynski] Even so, Walesa still has some fragments of political support from such groups as the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms

[Lamentowicz] Yes, he has such fragmentary support, but his advisers are weakening as a group. He constructed a most peculiar system of councils, a whole network of them, whose advice he has always ignored and ignores even now. They are made up of several hundred people, mostly eminent and respected figures, who have allowed themselves to be drawn into something that is a complete fabrication. It is most embarrassing to have to tell those people that they are involved in a fictitious undertaking, but, if they had any self-esteem, they would withdraw from it themselves. As it is, they willingly accept the status of "ignored advisers." Other people are quite scandalized about this state of affairs. I believe that someone who first appoints them to advisory positions and then treats them so perfunctorily does not deserve any trust himself. The creation of that fictitious advisory system is one of Walesa's fundamental mistakes.

[Gielzynski] But there is also a narrow circle of Walesa's true advisers.

[Lamentowicz] Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that it has a rather poor reputation—deservedly poor. Walesa's real advisers, with whom he works closely, are people who are decidedly uninteresting and without any good ideas.

[Gielzynski] So, do the fictitious advisers have good ideas then?

[Lamentowicz] Perhaps if Walesa had listened to their counsel more often, he would have avoided making many mistakes. What they suggested to him was often completely different from what he actually did. Moreover, Walesa's further mistake is that he introduced a method of ruling through his "personal court." In any democracy, particularly one that has only just been formed and is still very young, when people are highly sensitive to the need to respect its principles, the development of a "courtly rule" mechanism, with an emperorlike figure at its center, is completely disgraceful. It is tantamount to sneering at people's good judgment and common sense. What Walesa has done with the Belweder Palace is a sin against tradition and against democracy. Even Pilsudski did not drag the Belweder, as a national institution, so low that it was derided as a place of ridicule. Pilsudski may have been criticized for many valid reasons, but he did retain the dignity of his office. No one could ever have thought of him as a political clown.

[Gielzynski] Do you not think that now Walesa has even lost his ability to apply his "shorthand" style in speech and his colorful way of expressing his thoughts in brilliantly pithy phrases such as "I am for it, and even against it," an ability that is, after all, the quintessence of diplomacy?

[Lamentowicz] The president still has such stylistic leanings because he is incapable of speaking in precise terms. However, that is not his gravest offense. In 1980, he also spoke in his characteristic style, but he was serious then.

[Gielzynski] Then he had both his charisma and his intuition....

[Lamentowicz] Exactly—and also people who worked with him and were not ignored or ridiculed by him for protecting and defending him as their leader. Walesa appears to be incapable of appreciating the truth that politics is a team game that must be played in tandem with groups of people representing larger sections of the public who choose to hold the same kind of views. He seemingly no longer understands that politics is made together with people, not above their heads. Instead, he is still given to thinking up fanciful concepts such as giving each citizen 100 or 300 million zlotys, "sending certain people home in their socks," "devising a master plan," and so on. In Walesa's mind, such concepts seem to replace the need to do some solid thinking in terms of programs. Today, even the least critical observers can see for themselves that these are just empty phrases, that there is nothing behind them but an ambition to hang on to his position at the Belweder or the Namiestnikowski [Regent's] Palace. The latter name seems symbolic indeed because Walesa is given to parading in office rather than discharging a public office. However, this is not going to last for very long now.

Weekly Views Walesa's Advisory Councils

WS0405130094 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 7 May 94 p 16

[Article by Mariusz Janicki: "Who the President Listens to; Theoretically, the President Has a Few Hundred Advisers"]

[Text] The president is not able to know everything, even though he must rule the entire state—that is, everything. Therefore, he should have advisers—people who, for free or for a fee, share their knowledge with the head of state. The president may, but he does not have to, accept their suggestions. As it turns out, in practice, he most often "does not have to."

The president has almost 700 advisers, not counting his closest aides in the Office. These are members of the presidential councils, of which there are 12. another one is being established—the council for veteran affairs. This costs the President's Office approximately 700 million zlotys per year—the return of the costs, hotels, and mineral water. There have already been cases of returning money for air tickets on international routes (a member of the council for sport issues) and for a journey in a state car with a driver (a member of the scientific council). Added to this are printing costs—whatever is invented by the councils is printed—sometimes in the form of thick books. The councils also receive meals, even though their members complain about the quality.

Among the president's advisers are over 150 professors and more than 200 scientists with lesser titles. There are 10 priests and one bishop. Only five persons are called "lawyers." Moreover, the councils include journalists, peasants, sportsmen, scouts, writers, artists, businessmen, architects, and politicians. As a matter of fact, there are not many well-known and active politicians, apart from Bronislaw Geremek and Aleksander Malachowski. Incidentally, their roles are apolitical there.

The councils convene every second month, on average. The teams into which they are usually divided may meet more frequently. The president tries to attend every third meeting of each council, but he does not always make it. In practice, he attends the session of each council once a year. He has not yet met with the council for youth affairs. How, then, does he find out about the councils' advice? "In various ways—for example, from the press. It is always known when a meeting of one of the councils has been held. Apart from that, there are reports. It is not true that the president does not read anything. He likes theoretical political works, for instance, or reminiscences of politicians very much. Moreover, sessions are attended by his civil servants," says Minister Andrzej Zakrzewski, head of the Bureau of Political Servicing of the Office (he coordinates the activities of eight councils). The councils are supposed to act entirely independently. If the president wants to ask them about something, he will do so. It is worth adding that he does this rarely. Moreover, the councils were established as a result of initiatives of the people themselves: They came and said that they wanted to establish a council with the president. This gives importance. Therefore, their expectations cannot be too great. Recently, the president stated that he does not want any more councils, but the veterans still managed to ask for their own council. The employees of education may not have such a chance. "If we had accepted all of the motions, there would already be 50 councils," claims Andrzej Kojder, the main expert in the Political Servicing Bureau. Thus, all along, the councils have been in the wrong place—they were left far from the decision-making processes. They turned into discussion clubs that at some higher level are taken care of by Lech Walesa. Therefore, the thesis submitted by the Belweder's opponents that the councils would be the basis of a presidential government is not very realistic.

The councils are not satisfied with the president: He attends their sessions only rarely. It is not known to what extent he takes advantage of the experts' efforts. He does not give any feedback. Nor is the president satisfied with the councils: He says that they have become another forum at which the complaints and frustrations of various milieus are discussed, that their members simply want to get something done via the Belweder, that they do not submit any legislative drafts, even though the president has the right to launch a legislative initiative. He presents his complaints right at those meetings. A. Zakrzewski: "The president at one point interrupts a speaker and says: I am not satisfied with you all. Tell me what I should do, give me addresses, telephone numbers; work on a joint stand." Lech Falandysz, deputy of the head of the Office (he coordinates the work of two councils; one council is taken care of by Andrzej Kozakiewicz, and the council for media affairs by the President's Press Office) adds: "In general, Lech Walesa is not keen on lawyers. The same goes for Mieczyslaw Wachowski, who is very businesslike with me. Walesa probably no longer considers me a lawyer, and this is why he tolerates me. He is a practical man, and he often emphasizes it. His presidency is of an amateurish-sentimental, not professional, nature, and that is all right with me. I could not work with another president."

There are better councils and there are worse councils; much depends on the chairman. Andrzej Kajetan Wroblewski, who steers the scientific council with an iron hand, is listed as a model to follow. Also, the councils for agriculture and social policy work quite well. The former established contacts with Minister Smietanko. It is believed in the Office that the other councils should also meet with appropriate ministers; rhaps then they will become more specific and useful. However, not all of the ministers want that because, in fact, the councils are presidential not governmental.

The creative work that has been accomplished by the councils is various. Apart from issues that are really serious and strategic, in the list of achievements one finds such items as: "obtaining additional money for publishing a book by U.S. Vice President Al Gore,"

"declaration for Polish public opinion, expressing concern about the political climate in Poland," or "the resolution of a conflict related to the Frederic Chopin Society." Just as the president does not have a concept for the councils, the councils do not have a concept for themselves. The plenary sessions of the councils are more like a stereotype; their structure is more that of a seminar than of an advisory body: attendance list, opening address, discussion, conclusions, setting the date and the subject of the next session. Attendance is not very good. And all of this is happening in a vacuum. The councils' members are rather unanimous in saying that they do not really know whether the council is simply the prolongation of their scientific work and they are supposed to behave as they do at their universities, or it requires effort and a different attitude from them. However, there is no feedback for that.

Andrzej Kojder believes that there are too many well-known people in the councils who also have a hundred other tasks, who are members of various bodies, and for whom membership in the presidential council is a matter of prestige. They would very gladly meet with the president in the salons of the Belweder and drink coffee with him there. However, the president does not have time for that.

Indeed, the councils swarm with prominent names. One cannot say no to the president. There was only one such case: A representative of the Independent Association of University Students [NZS], who was invited to become a member of the council for youth affairs, rejected the offer because the NZS had not liked the president for some time then. Still, members of the councils are such people as Jerzy Turowicz, Piotr Buchner, Gustaw Holoubek, Adam Michnik, Leszek Balcerowicz, Wieslaw Ochman, Marcin Krol, Sobieslaw Zasada, Bronislaw Geremek, Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, Ryszard Kapuscinski, Father Wieslaw Nieweglowski, Aleksander Gieysztor, Lena Kolarska- Bobinska, Henryk Samsonowicz, Marek Rostworowski, and many others. These are all first-league people. There arises the question, then, why contact with the president is so poor and why the advisory usefulness of the councils is so small. Only twice did the president quote the opinions of the councils when he made a decision: when he agreed to the candidacy of Zbigniew Klajnert for culture minister in the Suchocka government and, for the second time and not so directly, in the case of the self-governmental election law, which he finally vetoed. Andrzej Zakrzewski: "Giving advice to Lech Walesa is difficult, extremely difficult. It must be done very skillfully, and much patience is required. At the start, the president most often does not want to listen to anything. Later on, when he thinks about it quietly, reads something, he sometimes changes his mind." Lech Falandysz: "Telling the president that he is to do this or that, or at least that he should do this or that, is out of the question. The entire issue can be forgotten. The style favored in the Belweder is that of the military: If something is pulled off, no one will commend you; if not, you will be reprimanded. People must often work and say things they think they should. Lech Walesa wants to have not advisers but generals, who would present him with several options; he would then choose one or think about his own option. This is why the professorial style of giving advice, full of reservations and doubts, does not satisfy him." Another Office civil servant, who wanted to remain anonymous, claims that the concept of advice-giving bodies is not very good now. The Research and Analysis Office does not really fulfill its function. The 20-person legal office, which, among other things, reviews all of the laws before they are signed by the president, must often give up its suggestions when it hears political arguments. There are no good relations between the law and politics. There is no advisory body that would have powers in both these areas, which would include outstanding specialists capable of convincing Lech Walesa of their political abilities, which is not easy because the president believes that he is the greatest political talent in the country—the greatest and the only talent. Besides, the president would have to trust such people, and this may be the most difficult matter.

Andrzej Zakrzewski: "Lech Walesa had bad experiences with political advisers at the time they were led by Zdzislaw Najder. After the Belweder was conquered by the Center Accord, the entire milieu linked to the Democratic Union moved away from him. The situation has not changed up to now. The president lacks this potential. It will not be replaced by existing councils, even if they are twice as numerous."

It looks like the president receives various, poorly coordinated signals, both important and not very important, on the basis of which he makes his decisions. Therefore, the decisions often mirror the nature and the level of the advice the head of state receives. Perhaps the situation looks like this: He does not trust those people who might give him sound advice, and those he trusts give such advice as they can give. Three years ago, my colleagues in POLITYKA wrote about the "loneliness of Mr. President." Since that time, many people have come and gone from the Belweder; however, the president still seems to be alone, even though he has a few hundred advisers. It is not known for sure whether this is a choice or a necessity.

UP's Bugaj on Presidential Race, Candidates

WS0405140394 Warsaw Radio Zet in Polish 0620 GMT 4 May 94

[Interview with Ryszard Bugaj, chairman of Union of Labor, by Andrzej Woyciechowski at the Radio Zet studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of Radio Zet" program—live]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Woyciechowski] Let us go back for a moment to the political nature of these strikes. Do you think the political nature of the strikes is associated with the coming presidential election, or is it perhaps still too early?

[Bugaj] You know, I do not think so. At any rate, I think that, so far, the president has been acting with some restraint. I have had the opportunity in the past to voice views in this very studio that were critical of the president, but, regarding this conflict, I must say he has been demonstrating restraint....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Will you vote for Walesa in the presidential election?

[Bugaj] I do not think so. I hope there will be a counter-candidate for whom I could vote....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] And what kind of candidate would it have to be? Let us not give specific names.

[Bugaj] You know, I would put it this way—and you are right about not mentioning any names. Whether he would be someone of left-wing or right-wing views—that is rather irrelevant to me, or at least I see that as a secondary issue. But, of course, I would like him to be someone who respects the Constitution very much, who is capable of resolving situations relevant to the president, and who is capable of being an umpire and of enjoying strong authority. But I must say I would prefer this person not to have very strong views because it might happen that he will have to cooperate with very different types of government, of a very different nature, with very different [words indistinct]

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] Do you know of such a person? Is there anyone like that in Poland?

[Bugaj] You know, I know an enormous number of such people, indeed, but the problem is that none of those figures are distinguished or outstanding enough to be able to take up the post without problems. I think there are such people in the Freedom Union [UW], and perhaps I could find them in our party, too. I would not hesitate to say there are also such people at the very right-wing end of the political scene. I think the most important matter is that we shape the Constitution in a way that would prevent the presidency from becoming something like the chief executive office, or something of that nature because....

[Woyciechowski, interrupting] And can I ask you to give a name now?

[Bugaj] You know, what I think is that, for instance, when it comes to the UW, both Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Jacek Kuron are the kinds of people who fulfill my criteria, and when it comes to our circles, both Karol Modzelewski and, for instance, Aleksander Malachowski fulfill the criteria. Which does not mean that they want or are able to run—that is a separate issue. [passage omitted]

Government, Solidarity Debate Salary Policy

WS0505101594 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 5 May 94 p 3

[Article by Jolanta Koral: "Trilateral Dispute Over Popiwek"]

[Text] The government, trade unions, and employers failed to come to an agreement yesterday on lifting the neopopiwek [enterprise tax on above-normative pay]. Trade unions and employers do not want the neopopiwek to be reinstated, whereas the government insists that the neopopiwek be in force until the end of the year.

Abandonment of the neopopiwek is one of the main demands put forward by Solidarity during its strikes. The All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement [OPZZ] and other trade union centers also agree with the demand.

Strikes Continue

Solidarity is dissatisfied with the results of talks within the trilateral commission. "There is no reason to stop the strike action," Ewa Lewicka of Solidarity told GAZETA WYBORCZA. "There is almost nothing we have managed to resolve completely, the government failed to come up with specific solutions, and a time schedule for meeting the demands of Solidarity, on which stopping the strike action depends, has not been agreed upon."

"Strikes as an invitation to talks place the government in a very difficult situation," Andrzej Baczkowski, deputy labor minister and the commission's chief, told journalists.

OPZZ Will See To It?

The government insists that the popiwek be reinstated now so as to prevent an eruption of inflation. It will be possible to lift the popiwek no sooner than the beginning of next year.

But employers and trade unionists do not fear excessive increases in salaries. OPZZ Deputy Chairman Maciej Manicki has told GAZETA WYBORCZA that, if the popiwek becomes law, the OPZZ will file a lawsuit with the Constitutional Tribunal. "We will see to it that salaries do not rise by more than the 27 percent contained in the budget. Other trade unions should also reduce employee appetites for the popiwek," Manicki declared during the commission's session.

"Over 200 trade unions are active in Poland, but there are only a few talking in this meeting hall," replied Deputy Finance Minister Waldemar Manugiewicz. "How does the OPZZ plan to go about managing the salary situation in all of the enterprises?"

Flexible Abandonment of the Popiwek

Despite this lack of agreement over the popiwek, Solidarity will talk within the commission about abandoning it, by, among other means, introducing a regulation of

salaries through collective agreements and through commercialization of state-owned enterprises.

The commission determined that the government will address the Sejm Presidium to have parliament adopt the so-called Chapter 11 of the Labor Law Code as soon as possible (this is provided for by the Agreement on State-Owned Enterprises). The chapter provides that the most important employee issues—such as salaries, working conditions, and so forth—should be decided jointly by employers and employee representations.

Adopting the law is indispensable for a lifting of popiwek. Then salary increases would no longer be directed centrally but, instead, would depend on collective agreements within enterprises.

What would also happen is that the current automatic dependence of salary increases in the production sector on such increases in the budget sector would be eliminated. Solidarity wants salaries for budget sector employees to be dependent on increases in the GDP.

In addition, valorizations of retirement and other kinds of pensions would be based not on increases in average salaries the way they are now but, instead, on increases in prices and in living expenses. (The government is supposed to present its proposals on this issue as soon as possible.)

Companies Full Speed Ahead!

According to Deputy Ownership Transformations Minister Andrzej Zebrowski, a commercialization of state-owned enterprises is a precondition for a lifting of the popiwek (the government has preliminarily approved of a draft law). The commercialization would be about gradually transforming the enterprises into companies of Commercial Law—for instance, into share companies—in which the state would participate.

The government would start with the most efficient enterprises first. Those enterprises that have economic losses would be subjected to supervision by contract managers before they are commercialized, which would make it possible to improve their financial results. The worst enterprises would simply be dissolved, but only after a plan for a further management of their wealth is prepared.

In the companies, supervisory boards would be set up, which would conclude collective agreements. A decision was made that the government is supposed to come up with proposals concerning the commercialization of enterprises by 15 June.

On 16 May, in turn, the commission will be dealing with a draft law on the privatization of state-owned enterprises (this is one of the laws making up the Agreement on State-Owned Enterprises). Among other things, the draft law describes the principles of employee participation in the privatization of an enterprise.

A Time Schedule? Not Yet

According to Solidarity, commercialization will go on for years, whereas salaries should be shaped through collective agreements and not through the popiwek. That is why Solidarity wants the popiwek to be lifted as soon as possible through the adoption of Chapter 11 of the Labor Law Code.

When asked about the impact of talks within the trilateral commission on the strikes, Longin Komolowski, a member of the Solidarity National Commission and of the strike headquarters, replied: "We have not reached the stage yet where we would be ready to accept a time schedule for working on the trade union's demands."

Let us recall that Solidarity has been making the end to the strike action dependent on approving such a time schedule and on the government's specific proposals and measures.

What They Managed To Agree Upon

The government agreed to meeting the demand by Solidarity that people who compute their taxes along with their spouses be able to make the lowest amount of advance tax payment. Deputy [Finance] Minister Manugiewicz reported that the Finance Ministry has already prepared a legal measure regarding the issue, and the commission is due to debate it on 16 May. The government also approves of the idea that, effective in 1995, tax breaks be introduced that would take into account the cost of commuting to work (the government is to submit its proposals soon.)

On 16 May, the commission is also scheduled to deal with a second batch of demands by Solidarity: a popular enfranchisement of citizens, reducing the workweek to 40 hours, social support for the poorest families, and salaries for budget-sector employees.

Solidarity initially refused to agree to the 16 May date. "It is too late," the trade unionists said. They insisted that this amounts to a violation of the Konin agreement. They made it clear that the strike may spread even further by 16 May. The government was trying to convince the trade unionists that it needs the time to prepare its proposals. But, in the end, Solidarity was outvoted on the issue.

New Finance Minister's Theories, Skills Viewed

WS0405123094 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 4 May 94 p 11

[Article by Janusz Jankowiak: "Grandpa Kolodko and Our Troubles"]

[Text] Who is Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz W. Kolodko? He is someone who, while writing an economic report on the postcommunist era, is capable of mentioning Balcerowicz's name just once, in a footnote, while not even once mentioning Dariusz Rosati (who, after all, was the founding father of the anti-Balcerowicz

opposition). Instead, Kolodko mentions his own works, articles, and short reports more than 10 times.

Sure, one can do it this way, too. Let us not ignore the fact that the above sheds some light on character-related vices and professional qualifications of the most recent deputy prime minister/finance minister.

Anti-Winiecki

Because we described Rosati as one of the founding fathers, Kolodko deserves the description of the grandfather of the anti-Balcerowicz opposition, or, at any rate, he deserves the description of someone older and famous for his authority in this harmonious family.

Kolodko is a fundamentalist critic of the changes taking place in the postcommunist economy. Placed next to him, Rosati is indeed a real gentle lamb. ("The concept of a transformation policy carried out, in practice, has lead to a situation where a huge drop in output is accompanied by an avalanche-type increase in unemployment and an extensive crisis in public finances. It would be hard to find clearer proof of the mistaken nature of this concept," the current deputy prime minister writes.)

Against this backdrop, Kolodko's position on the economic legacy of the Polish People's Republic [PRL] is quite special. While writing about some mistakes that were made, he speaks at the same time about dynamic growth and a balanced budget. This reminds me of a subtle admonition, with many elements of affirmation contained in it. There is no doubt that Kolodko's assessment of Poland after 1989 is much harsher than that of the PRL period. Naturally, he has a right to that.

But it is hard to avoid the feeling that there is a very personal and emotional attitude of Kolodko on the issues he evaluates, lying at the very core of his criticism. If I were to sketch a psychological portrait of Grzegorz Kolodko, I would have to say that this very talented economist, by his decision to associate himself with a political orientation that went into opposition after the fall of PRL, had no direct influence on the direction of economic changes in Poland after 1989.

A wounded ambition and complex of the rejected have been shaping the aggressive tone of many of Kolodko's public statements. Haughtiness and a lack of respect for those who have different views—and also unconcealed joy over their mistakes—can all be sensed in the statements. Every now and then, a reader of Kolodko's works comes across: "official optimism of the new elites," "nonsense plans and forecasts," "a new propaganda of success," "a lack of realism, professionalism, and insufficient imagination," "atrophy of the sense of responsibility," "manipulating the confused public opinion," "economic charlatanry," "neoliberal orthodoxy," "populism," and similar terms.

It is interesting that Grzegorz Kolodko finds an alter ego in the Polish economic literature. That alter ego is Professor Jan Winiecki, a representative of constitutional liberalism, a hard-working fighter against socialism, which, in Winiecki's view, is the result of a mental aberration.

It would be hard to imagine two people so different from one another and yet so similar as Kolodko and Winiecki. They are different on literally everything: the past and their views. What is common to them is the style of writing and the type of personality. In both cases, we are dealing with people who are intolerant and who cannot take criticism. It is enough to familiarize oneself with any piece written by either man.

I doubt that these are the best references for someone to manage the economy of a country with 40 million people. At any rate, Kolodko tends to be an anti-Winiecki of the governing coalition rather than its anti-Balcerowicz (which Rosati was). It seems that the difference is rather significant.

[Union of Labor Chairman] Ryszard Bugaj has described Kolodko as a red liberal. As far as colors are concerned, I do not feel authorized to speak out. As far as liberalism is concerned, however, in my view Bugaj is wrong. Kolodko is definitely an economist of modern social democracy's left wing. He is to the left of not only Balcerowicz but also of Rosati, even though, naturally, he is to the right of Bugaj at the same time.

But, according to traditional left-wing standards of the 1970's, Kolodko is still a liberal because he has spoken out many times against the budget being burdened with social expenditures to an excessive degree (such as is happening now), against inflation, spinning the demand side, and against a permanent budget deficit. He has stressed the need to reduce the public debt, the need to legalize the economic "gray zone," and has demanded restrictive monetary policies.

But, according to standards of constitutional liberalism, literally nothing that Kolodko has to say on economy, can be defended—that is, except for just one issue: his position on the balance of public finances. On an orthodox scale, Kolodko is an incomplete quarter-liberal, at the most. Never mind the colors.

The Absolutely Indispensable State

Kolodko negates an emergence in the postcommunist economy of an independent mechanism widely known in regular market systems, which causes growth after a period of depression. Such an argument implies that the state is ascribed an active role in setting economic growth in motion. So Kolodko draws a logical conclusion that allowing for "creative destruction" after 1989 was a major mistake. Institutional and structural changes should not have been implemented through shock, like a macroeconomic stabilization. The indispensable transformations "should have been managed by the governments with sensitivity." That is a clear suggestion that the state uphold part of the inefficient demand, which is an outlet for costly and obsolete production.

Generally speaking, Kolodko's expectations vis-a-vis the state are high. The state is not only supposed to contribute to securing the proper conditions for stabilization and to deal with establishing a market infrastructure, but, in Kolodko's view, must also get involved in the process of allocating capital and must direct that capital to those places where, according to the government, it will be utilized in the best possible manner. The state should even demonstrate "direct production activity."

The state/the owner should manage its own wealth well. There would be nothing wrong with this otherwise correct statement by Kolodko if it were not for another idea being promoted by the professor—namely, that "one must not privatize more or faster than is possible." Someone could draw the conclusion from this that there is too much privatization in Poland and that it is taking place too fast. But that would be a completely false conclusion. Kolodko's position on privatization is confusing. He thinks the rate of privatization is not very impressive currently and so one must increase it. So the warning mentioned earlier is understood to be of a preventative nature.

But, for those who managed to "swallow" the warning while concentrating primarily on the announcement of greater privatization than up to now, Professor Kolodko has another surprise up his sleeve: He says there is a close relationship between the rate of privatization and the level of state activity. It seems like a quite trivial thing. In strictly technical terms, all it means is that the more somebody sells, the harder he has to work. But it cannot be ruled out that this argument by Kolodko should be interpreted in less trivial fashion: The faster the rate of privatization, the more government involvement in the economy.

A Pentagon Out of Sync

To define Kolodko's economic views, his position on the unemployment issue may also be quite helpful. Fortunately, in this regard, we are no longer condemned to trying to track down unclear traces.

Grzegorz Kolodko is the author of a theoretical concept that allows one to measure the level of economic stabilization in practically every country of the world. His "stabilization pentagon" (described in a separate book) is an intellectually interesting attempt at defining the relationship among the growth of national product, unemployment, inflation, the state of the budget, and the current balance of payments.

In the view of many economists, the practical utility of the pentagon theory is rather small due to many simplifications contained in it (for instance ignoring the NAIRU [expansion unknown] indicator, which means unemployment rate not resulting in increased inflation, or Kolodko's assumption that the cost of bringing inflation down, as measured by unemployment, increases in a linear fashion, which is obviously false, inasmuch as bringing inflation from 600 percent down to 60 percent is less costly than a reduction from 60 percent to 6 percent). That is why one must take a distanced position on the dogmatic views on the miserable effects of stabilization in postcommunist economies, as determined by using the pentagon theory.

What is more important is that Kolodko's concept makes it possible to describe in much better terms the economic trend to which he belongs. For instance, according to Kolodko, stabilization increases along with production, and the faster unemployment falls, the greater the degree of stabilization. This is undoubtedly a result of the growth theory as viewed by social democrats, which ignores the issue of the cost of using resources. In the eyes of liberals, that omission absolutely disqualifies the pentagon theory as a credible economic instrument.

Charges concerning links between stabilization and the state of the current balance of state payments are of a similar nature. Kolodko completely ignores the significance of the inflow and outflow of capital, for the state's balance of payments. But, in reality—and this is demonstrated not just by the case of Poland—even a significant deficit of current turnover going on for years does not necessarily have to drain state hard-currency reserves.

It looks as if the author, while creating his pentagon, picked and chose those elements (unemployment, trade deficit) that support the theory on the miserable effects of stabilization, while rejecting (in the assumptions that simplified the model) anything that could contradict the argument of the miserable effects of stabilization.

A State-Controlled Kick in the Pants

Kolodko's nomination is significant for a number of reasons:

First, the left wing finally has its own transition ritual. The left wing's economic team is being headed by a prestigious, talented, and very aggressive critic of Balcerowicz's policies.

Second, the return to Kolodko's candidacy is, in a way, a gesture of despair on the part of the Democratic Left Alliance and the prime minister himself. I am saying that because what really happened between fall and spring to make Kolodko's comeback possible? The deputy prime minister has written somewhere that neoliberalism begets populism. Someone could make the observation now that Prof. Kolodko has finally gained power on the basis of that very populism.

Third, the confusion surrounding the finance minister demonstrated that politicians of a single camp are capable of promoting people of quite differing views for the economy's chief over a relatively short period of time.

A nomination of Rosati would make it likely that an easing of monetary policies will take place, which means introducing more money into the economy, but it would also mean increasing the state's fiscal discipline (for instance, a restrictive execution of tax laws and of other

laws resulting in revenue for the state budget, or carrying out enterprise insolvencies). Kolodko's concept seems to be exactly the opposite of that. In a recent work, he wrote about the need to apply nondogmatic "instruments in the area of revenues, flexible, active, and proinvestment fiscal policies, and restrictive monetary policies."

What Rosati, the would-be deputy prime minister, wanted to tighten, Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko, who assumed the post while being recommended by the same left wing, wants to ease up. And vice versa. What is this all about?

On a cautious note, I think this demonstrates the politicians' weak knowledge concerning detailed views by economists who are proposed for the state's supreme posts, or else it demonstrates that the politicians just do not think such details are very important. What is important, they think, is that Borowski, Rosati, and Kolodko belong to the same political team and so are included in the same trend that is described as a reformist or liberal left wing. Apart from that common denominator of the most general nature, everything else does not count. The truth is that this view is obviously false. The "everything else" does count a lot, by all means.

If Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko tries to implement demands that he voiced as a professor/ reviewer, then it is only now that our economy will get a real state-controlled kick in the pants.

I think this makes it easy to understand why, from the standpoint of liberal economists, Rosati, the founding father, who was much less unequivocal than Kolodko, may have seemed like the lesser evil.

Minister Kaczmarek on Privatization Process

PM0405124594 Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish 27 Apr 94 p 4

[Interview with Ownership Transformations Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek by correspondent Mariola Krzyzaniak; place and date not given]

[Text] [Krzyzaniak] The most popular privatization method is the employees shareholding scheme. But your ministry is rejecting increasing numbers of applications for this form of ownership transformation from employees' joint-partnership companies. Employees resent these refusals, saying: First you let us choose our preferred form of privatization, and now you refuse to approve it.

[Kaczmarek] Employees' joint-partnership companies are very good at seeing to work forces' social welfare provisions. On the other hand, there are two areas they find difficult to deal with. The first is the price, usually too low, which the employees' joint companies offer in the bid to buy their enterprises. The second area is these companies' credibility as regards realization of the investment-package deals. I am an advocate of the quickest method of selling small and medium-size enterprises. I believe that, in their case, success is measured in terms of their stable functioning and development. I do not need to aim for getting the highest possible prices for them. However, I should like to adopt a slightly different approach to larger enterprises.

[Krzyzaniak] Where does a medium enterprise end and a large one begin?

[Kaczmarek] I think privatization by liquidation can be approved for enterprises employing up to 400 persons. In some cases, this number can be larger: We can negotiate in the case of enterprises with up to 500-700 employees. The upper limit is an enterprise whose turnover, in money terms, amounts to a maximum of 12 million ECU's [European Currency Units] and whose statutory fund and enterprise fund amount to a maximum of 8 million ECU's. If a given enterprise fits in this category, we will happily approve privatization by liquidation. If it exceeds them, it should be privatized by capital takeover. Of course, in well-justified cases, we can depart from these limits.

[Krzyzaniak] To what extent is your limit on privatization through employees' shareholding schemes imposed by the requirement that the Ownership Transformations Ministry transfer all profits from privatization by capital takeover to the state budget?

[Kaczmarek] Such a requirement does exist, and we must remember that the state budget does not profit much from a transaction whereby an enterprise is sold to its employees and its status changed to that of a an employees' joint-partnership company. However, we can still view employees' joint-partnership companies as taxpayers. I am not against employees' companies. I believe we should seek solutions together, in partnership.

[Krzyzaniak] The progress of privatization has been halted in certain sectors, especially those connected with agriculture. Debates are in progress on whether privatization should be controlled by the Ownership Transformations Ministry solely, or also by other ministries, such as the Agriculture Ministry and the Industry and Trade Ministry.

[Kaczmarek] I am firmly opposed to the transfer of ownership transformation powers to other ministries. They should attend, instead, to the creation of model programs and solutions for individual branches of industry. We have a ready example here in the grain, sugar, and tobacco products manufacturing industries. It is strange, to say the least, that the same ministry that halts the privatization of tobacco products manufacturing enterprises issues licenses to other firms to build new cigarette factories. Of course, we, too, implement model solutions. An example here is the National Investment Funds project. The only people with sufficient expertise on privatization can be found at the Ownership Transformations Ministry and voivodship offices. We often hear complaints about the privatization schemes and, consequently, about my ministry. But the majority

of investigation proceedings, prosecution cases, protests, and problems with ownership supervision that accompany the implementation of the privatization scheme are connected with other sectors.

[Krzyzaniak] Nevertheless, there has been a noticeable slowing down of the privatization processes. One of the reasons for this is the conflict between individual ministries over their respective ranges of competence. What is the source of this conflict?

[Kaczmarek] Without any doubt, work on the Enterprises Pact and the associated promise of the issue of free shares to employees caused considerable delays. Employees preferred to wait until the pact came into force. I declare that I will not touch the 20 percent of shares reserved for employees. Another reason is that the management structure at the voivodship level is currently undergoing a series of changes, and it is in voivodships that two-thirds of all privatization operations take place.

[Krzyzaniak] Foreign investors buy shares in our factories when they bring their money to Poland. There is also another group of investors that builds factories from scratch on our territory: these are the so-called greenfield projects. Examples of the latter practice are the chocolate factory near Wroclaw that is being built by Cutberry [as published; Cadbury would have been intended but transcribed incorrectly by interviewer] or the Dutch-Japanese battery-manufacturing plant in Gniezno. These plants are often competitive in relation to already established Polish enterprises.

[Kaczmarek] My principal area of responsibility is to encourage foreign investors interested in Polish enterprises to undertake to transform and modernize these enterprises. Today these projects receive priority status in which a strategic investor enters the enterprise. On the other hand, I cannot say I am not interested in the greenfield projects you just mentioned. They provide additional bridging components in our scheme, and they greatly facilitate our cooperation with international financial institutions and foreign investors. If we refuse entry to greenfield projects and welcome only investors interested in bringing their capital to our privatization projects, we will build a trap for ourselves and discourage much Western capital from coming here. Because these are firms that operate on the principle of starting from scratch, we spend tremendous sums of money on getting foreign investors interested in Poland, and this is beginning to bring results. Foreign capital investors have already invested more than $3 billion. The Germans, for example, were quite upset to learn that they are only in fifth place as regards the amount of capital invested. They have been left behind by the Americans, the multinational capital, the Italians, and the Dutch.

Iliescu Congratulates Middle East Leaders

AU0405200794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] President Ion Iliescu today sent separate telegrams to Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and president of the State of Palestine, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin, and Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Shim'on Peres, in which he congratulated them on the occasion of signing the accord on autonomy in Gaza and Jericho, an act to whose finalization, the cable reads, the recent talks held in Bucharest between the Palestinian leader and the Israeli foreign minister also made a contribution.

President Iliescu reasserts Romania's wish to continue to contribute to the achievement of favorable conditions for a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

In another telegram sent to Husni Mubarak, president of the Arab Republic of Egypt, President Iliescu voices his appreciation for the steady actions made by Egypt and its president to achieve peace in the Middle East region. President Iliescu also expresses the belief that Romanian-Egyptian relations will continue to develop to the mutual benefit of both countries.

Timisoara Memo Protests King's Canceled Visit

AU0405120494 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 30 Apr 94 p 3

["Memorandum Addressed to the Council of Europe by the City of Timisoara"; place and date not given]

[Text] On occasion of the Easter Holiday, the former sovereign of Romania, King Mihai I, was invited to Timisoara by his holiness the metropolitan of Banat, the Timisoara Municipality Council, and by the mayor of the city. The invitation was based on the fact that King Mihai is the founder of the Timisoara metropolitan cathedral.

For the third time, the Romanian Government denied King Mihai the right to visit Timisoara, this time invoking false security problems. We wish to notify international public opinion that:

1. Mihai of Romania is a Romanian citizen who was born in Romania, his parents being Romanian citizens. According to Romania's current Constitution and the stipulations of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, that gesture of the government is an abuse.

2. Considering that not a single foreign citizen has been subject to circulation restrictions on the territory of Romania, the imposing of such restrictions upon a Romanian citizen is an arbitrary and discriminatory act.

3. The stance adopted by the Romanian Government offends our dignity as citizens of the city of Timisoara, by the sacrifice of which in Romania, in December 1989, the way was opened for liberty and democracy. At the same time, such practice maintains a state of tension in the country and creates suspicion that may divide Romanian society and prevent national reconciliation.

We request that the Council of Europe should discuss in its special commissions, as well as in its plenary session, the abuse signaled by us. The attention granted by the Council of Europe to the present memorandum would represent moral reparation for us.

Editorial on PDSR's 'Transylvanian Offensive'

94CH0215A Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 22 Mar 94 p 1

[Editorial by Janos Gyarmath under the "We Cannot Leave This Without Commentary" rubric: "Transylvanian Offensive"]

[Text] The ambitious Adrian Nastase and the governing party thinks that the time has come to obliterate, or attempt to obliterate, the weak election results of the Social Democracy Party (of Romania) [RSZDP] in Transylvania. As we recall, in spite of all his efforts, Ion Iliescu and his troupe did not succeed at the time in "building a nest" in Transylvania, in the municipalities of which the votes were acquired by the two opposing regional parties, the Romanian National Unity Party [RNEP] and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ], as well as by the Democratic Convention of Romania [RDK] which was supported by the latter. This fact might lead one to conclude that the election program of the SZDP did not capture the sympathy of Transylvanians, for two simple reasons. On the one hand, its economic policy did not promise the changes for the towns and villages which Transylvanians expected after the change of regime in 1989, and on the other hand, the national strategy proved to be opportunist, because it did not satisfy extremist Romanian movements, the Romanian Hearth [Vatra Romaneasca], but neither did it present a modern program, befitting the spirit of Europe, which could have appealed to the moderate elements, or to the Hungarians. Thus, in the tense atmosphere following the events of Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures], essentially with the powerful help of the governing party, nationalism and xenophobia gained ground in Transylvania, accompanied by the rise of the RNEP and "Funarism." At the same time, all the people who were disappointed in the Front(s) showed their support for the RDK, so that the Hungarians, who became relatively isolated, would unequivocally vote for the RMDSZ.

One cannot grasp exactly what is more annoying for the SZDP, which has a virtual monopoly in the other historical provinces and especially in the countryside—whether that the RNEP lured a great number of Romanians from it or rather that by now, in three rounds of voting, the Hungarians ended up on the other side, on that of the RDK? Perhaps both. Of course not to the same degree. Whereas the SZDP has been cooperating, at least in Parliament, with the RNEP for two years, in

spite of all irritations and partnerial unruliness, the RDK and the RMDSZ, which delivers votes to it, are indisputably on the other side, that is to say, in the opposition.

However, it seems that the balance of power is shifting in Transylvania. It seems that because of its extremist and demagogue program, because of Mayor Funar's unruliness and its ties to Caritas, the RNEP is losing speed and at the same time ground. But in whose favor? Not necessarily in favor of the governing party, with which not only the Hungarians but also the Romanian population of the province are more and more dissatisfied. Thus, an early election would favor the RDK, the parties of which could lately be labeled less and less "henchmen of the Hungarians" because they hardly ever stand up to accusations against the RMDSZ, or for the party's legitimate demands....

In other words, one must make a move, Adrian Nastase decided. And he made a move. Moreover, he did so on Saturday, in Cluj, in the "nest" of the RNEP, where he convened a regional meeting and sketched the direction and strategy of his Transylvanian offensive before 16 SZDP chairmen and prefects from Transylvania and Bansag. This signals that on the one hand, the governing party would like to fill the void left by the decline of the RNEP, and on the other hand, somehow curtail the RMDSZ, namely by "alienating" several organizations of Hungarians from it. In other words, if up to now his purpose was to drive a wedge between the RDK and the RMDSZ, to isolate the latter, and to strip it from its allies, then from now on he wants more. With a somewhat modified national policy, he wants to decrease the political influence of the organizations that safeguard the interests of Hungarians and to demonstrate that the majority of the Hungarian population does not follow the "extremists" of the RMDSZ and does not want any kind of autonomy; that is, having lost its patience and having resigned itself to everyday problems, it would be satisfied with much less. This is the source of the praise for the RMDSZ but also of the serious accusations that it conducts ambiguous politics and that some of its leaders are accomplices of the Budapest power structure....

One cannot leave without commentary Adrian Nastase's "political science" analysis and the intentions of the SZDP. One must take his ideas seriously. After all, what he planned is a challenge, a challenge to a "game of chess" which it would be a sin to begin unprepared. Thus, it would be good to set aside for a while internal disputes, and put out heads together, so that in this game, which promises to be serious, there would be no gaps left, even by accident, in the unprotected defense lines of the RMDSZ....

Vacaroiu, Chinese Military Group Discuss Ties

AU0405191794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu received this evening a Chinese military delegation led by Colonel General Zhang Wannian, member of the Central Military Commission and chief of staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, who is visiting our country on the invitation of the Romanian Ministry of National Defense. The meeting was attended by Lieutenant General Dumitru Cioflina, chief of staff of the Romanian Army.

After conveying to the Romanian prime minister greetings from his counterpart, the guest expressed satisfaction that the good Romanian-Chinese relations, unaltered by the changes that have taken place in international life, continue to develop in the spirit of the old traditions that bind us.

The visit of the delegation that he is leading, through its very rich program and through the various exchanges of opinions that it occasions, makes a contribution to a better familiarization of the sides with each other and to the enhancement of relations of cooperation between the two armies and two countries.

The prime minister assured the Chinese guest that the Romanian people follow with keen interest China's outstanding achievements on the road to economic reform in the past 15 years and also assured him that this country, with its huge potential, represents one of the current foreign political guide marks of Romania.

As a continuation of bilateral contacts in the past months, the visit to Romania of Li Peng, premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, scheduled for summer 1994, is expected with great interest, reads a press release faxed to us by a spokesman for the government.

Iliescu, German Official Discuss Issues

AU0405202994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] Today President Iliescu received Hort Waffenschmidt, parliamentary state secretary in the German Interior Ministry of the Federal Government in charge of problems of expatriates, at Cotroceni Palace.

The guest stated to the press that on this occasion the sides discussed issues referring to cooperation between Romania and Germany and he showed satisfaction with the development of economic relations in the past months. Waffenschmidt said that the German minority in Romania represents a connecting bridge between the two countries and he expressed thanks for every positive action taken for the ethnic Germans.

However, he did voice some claims, such as exemption from German taxes for humanitarian aid from Germany, a better selection of television programs in the German language, and the implementation of the land law, and called for a public declaration to be issued that refers to discrimination after World War II in Romania and the new cooperation between Romania and Ger

many. He also stressed that Germany and Romania should cooperate in Europe and see to it that people on this continent live in peace and freedom, which is an essential requirement of a united Europe.

In turn, President Ion Iliescu, answering a question on customs duties on humanitarian aid and on the implementation of the land law, said that these problems concern the Romanian state and its citizens and they will be examined with interest; however, they are part and parcel of a larger group of problems that our country is currently facing.

Iliescu also said that he believes that the Deutsche Welle radio station presents the realities of Romania in a malicious and subjective manner and added that what disturbs us is not fair criticism but the distortion of reality, our correspondent Sorin Croitorescu informed us.

'Row' Over Serbian Tanks in Exclusion Zone

AU0505123894 Paris AFP in English 1213 GMT 5 May 94

[Report by Bernard Besserglik]

[Text] Sarajevo, May 5 (AFP)—A new international peace effort due to begin Thursday ran into trouble when a row erupted over UN concessions to Serbian forces in the implementation of a NATO-imposed exclusion zone around Sarajevo. A mediation team, the first to include both US and Russian diplomats, was due in Sarajevo later in the day to build on efforts begun last week to bridge apparently irreconcilable differences between the Bosnian government and separatist Serbs over a country-wide cease-fire.

The team was due to meet with leaders of the Moslem-led government and Bosnian Serbs before reporting back to a ministerial conference on Bosnia which diplomats in Geneva said would be held May 13 in the Swiss city. But prospects for the peace effort were undermined by Bosnian fury over a UN decision to allow seven Serb tanks pass through the exclusion zone around Sarajevo to the Mount Igman area just west of the city, where the Serbs fear a new offensive by Moslem troops, UN officials said.

Two Serb tanks passed through the 20-kilometre (12.5-mile) exclusion zone on Wednesday, escorted by units of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), UNPROFOR spokesman Eric Chaperon said. Agreement for the manoeuvre was given by UN envoy Yasushi Akashi and UNPROFOR commander Bertrand de Lapresle at a meeting with Serb leaders in Pale on Tuesday, Chaperon said.

The agreement gave authorisation for seven tanks to pass through the zone, and early Wednesday two tanks arriving from Pale "were escorted from Lukavica (within the exclusion zone) and out of the zone towards Trnovo" in the Mount Igman area, he said. The other five tanks were to follow "in the next few days" at a time and date to be arranged, he said.

The Bosnian government responded to the deal Thursday by demanding the dismissal of Akashi. Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said the government insisted on Akashi's departure because "UNPROFOR is making deals with the Serbs." An UNPROFOR source speaking on condition of anonymity said the arrangement over the tanks involved the UNPROFOR command based in Zagreb and by-passed officials in Sarajevo. He described the agreement as "a new victory" for the Serbs. "The go-ahead was given directly by Zagreb without consulting Sarajevo," said the source, who complained of the increasingly restrictive interpretation being given by UN officials of the exclusion zone imposed around Sarajevo in February. A third Serb T-34 tank from Pale was intercepted within the exclusion zone on Tuesday was one of the five covered under the agreement with Akashi and Lapresle, Chaperon said.

It was still under UNPROFOR supervision, he said, describing its presence in the zone as part of a "special agreement at the highest level."

Chaperon confirmed that the Bosnian Government was reinforcing its troop presence around Mount Ingman, a strategic height overlooking Sarajevo, but he said reports that as many as 10,000 men had been deployed there were exaggerated.

Unconfirmed reports surfaced Wednesday that Akashi had cut a deal with the Serbs under which UNPROFOR would let the Serb tanks pass through the Sarajevo exclusion zone in exchange for the Serbs lifting their blockade of a convoy of British peacepeekers trying to reach the eastern town of Gorazde.

The convoy, carrying 168 British troops, was allowed to proceed late Tuesday from Rogatica, where it had been held up by Serb officials since Sunday, but Chaperon said he was "not aware" of any link with the concession regarding the Serb tanks. Tension remained high in northern Bosnia in the region around Brcko, where UNPROFOR has observed a build-up of forces by both sides in the past two weeks. Serbs are believed to wish to widen the corridor in which Brcko is situated and which links Serb-held lands in eastern and western Bosnia, while government forces could seek to cut through the five-kilometre (three-mile) strip to the Croatian border.

In New York early Wednesday the UN Security Council warned both sides of the "serious consequences" of any offensive action, following a proposal earlier by France to create a 10-kilometre (six-mile) exclusion zone around the Serb-held town. UN military observers have already been deployed to the area, and the Security Council ordered envoy Akashi to seek "enhanced aerial surveillance of this and other areas of tension."

Bosnian Army Commander in Chief Rasim Delic was quoted on Bosnian television Monday as saying that Brcko was the "key to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Croat Blames Muslims for Blocking Agreement

LD0405214794 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1915 GMT 4 May 94

[Interview with Ivan Bender, chairman of the chamber of deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, by an unidentified correspondent; date and place not given—from the "U Potrazi" program]

[Text] [Correspondent] Our guest tonight is Ivan Bender, chairman of the chamber of deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna's parliament.

Why was the parliament of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina not in session last week, between 28 and 30 April as announced ?

[Bender] We had several discussions with the Muslim side and we agreed that the constituent assembly should

take place at the end of April. However, the Muslim side did not respect the agreement and the assembly did not take place because there was nothing to discuss. We should begin implementing the agreement in principle—the selection of cadres and demarcation on the ground—and we should adopt the constitution.

[Correspondent] There are two problems regarding the selection of cadres: Things seem to be stuck in connection with the posts of the president of the federation and the prime minister.

[Bender] This is a problem because the Muslim side wants to keep both the post of the president of the federation and the post of the premier. This is not logical and we have made our standpoints clear through the presidency of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] and the presidential council of Herceg-Bosna. We cannot change this and there is no reason why we should. One of the top posts must be given to the Croats. In this case it is a priority, having in mind that Alija Izetbegovic has been the president of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for four years now. If we want to have some kind of continuity as we have said earlier then it is logical that the Croats should have 50 percent of the posts in the Federation in the forthcoming period.

[Correspondent] What do you have to say about Alija Izetbegovic's appeal to President Tudjman, urging the implementation of the Washington agreement, if you think that the Muslim side does not want to implement the initial steps as far as the constitution is concerned.

[Bender] I believe that it is an attempt to relegate responsibility from the Muslim side to us Croats. I believe that the world will find it easy to see through this attempt. At our last meeting in Sarajevo, which was attended by Mr. Silajdzic with his team and by us from Herceg-Bosna it was obvious... [pauses] The U.S. envoy was present there as well as the Croatian ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina. They attended the meeting and they could see for themselves. We gave our proposals and an alternative while the Muslims did not.

[Bender] Consequently, one can see—I can state in clear terms—that the Muslims are not interested in implementing the agreement. If they were interested they would take steps, as it is their turn now. We agreed that they should convene the next meeting of our working groups so we can embark on the next round of talks.

[Correspondent] Why should they do it?

[Bender] Because it was we who requested and organized both meetings. It is Silajdzic's turn, that is, his team and Alija Izetbegovic. We expect, we are willing, to continue talks wherever and whenever. But these talks should be within the framework of the constitution and the agreement. By no means can we go beyond this.

[Correspondent] Mr. Bender, both you and President Zubak as well as the chairman of the executive board of the Croatian Democratic Community, Markovic, frequently stress that you are not going to tolerate a situation in which Croat cadres in the federation are appointed by someone else. What are you referring to, precisely?

[Bender] I believe that everyone is aware that the HDZ is the only legal and legitimate representative of the Croats in the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna. It is logical then that all the rights to elect and appoint cadres to any position and represent the Croats are vested in the HDZ.

[Correspondent] Who does want to manage cadres instead of the HDZ? Tell us explicitly.

[Bender] There are attempts by those people in the so-called HNV [Croat National Council], headed by Ivo Komsic, to appropriate some kind of right at their talks with Sarajevo's HDZ city branch. We have been present there on three occasions. One should listen to these people and understand what they think about that tiny bunch who gather there and call themselves representatives of the HNV. The leadership of the HDZ Sarajevo city branch are firmly in line with the policy of the HDZ and the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna.

[Correspondent] Who supports the HNV and its policy of appointing cadres, as you say?

[Bender] In our area, I believe, no one supports them. I also firmly believe that the HNV's policy and that tiny bunch who call themselves HNV are behind everything that is going on in the area of our state of Croatia.

[Presenter] And lastly, what next?

[Bender] I believe that it is in the interest of both the Muslims and the Croats to try and implement this skeletal agreement, the Washington agreements and our constitution. Over the next few days we are going to wait and see what the other side does. We must make use of this period of cease-fire and consolidate our ranks. We must primarily improve some things in our army, in our police and in political life and the economy. Wherever it is possible, production should be revived. I believe that our visits, ranging from president Zubak to Markovic and everyone else among us who is touring the area, we must implement some things on the ground. [sentence as heard] We must return to the creation of living conditions.

Croatian Leader Rejects Muslim Demands

LD0405162494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1609 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, May 4 (TANJUG)—The Croat side in the ex-Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BIH) renounces a Moslem demand that Moslems should hold the offices of president and prime minister of a future Moslem-Croat federation, it was stated Wednesday by Kresimir Zubak, leader of the Croatian community in the BIH. Zubak, in a statement to the Croatian radio

which calls him "president of the presidential council of the Croatian republic of Herzeg-Bosna (HRHB)," asserts that the "process of establishing a federation has been delayed by the Bosnian Moslem side which even tries to accuse Croat representatives for buying time."

Said Zubak, "the Bosnian Moslem representatives now seek that Moslems should be both president and prime minister of the federation, for what there are no grounds in the constitution, and this demand would not be accepted by the Croatian side."

An agreement on a Croat-Moslem federation in the BIH, and on the later entry of this joint state into a confederal union with the neighbouring Croatia, was signed, under strong U.S. pressure, in Washington early March. It ended fierce clashes between Bosnian Moslems and Croats for territories which had lasted since the beginning of last year. Zubak said he did not know when the talks on a Moslem-Croat federation would continue because no invitations were as yet coming in from Sarajevo. He recalled that Bosnian Croat representatives had so far gone to Sarajevo three times for talks, never reaching accord on leaders of a future federation.

The Moslem Radio Sarajevo reported that opposition parties in the Republic of Croatia had begun to wonder why Croatian President Franjo Tudjman was now shelving off for a second time his official visit to Sarajevo. The Radio quoted Dobrosav Paraga, leader of the extreme rightist "Croatian Party of Right" (HSP), as telling a news conference in Zagreb Wednesday that Tudjman was delaying his visit to Sarajevo "simply because he does not want the Washington agreement on a Moslem-Croat federation to be implemented." Paraga asserted that Tudjman "does not want either the enforcement of the Washington accord or the renouncement of Herzeg-Bosna as it is termed." Paraga did not believe in any technical problems around Tudjman's visit. He did not accept an assertion that "the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) does not want to secure the Croatian president's travel to Sarajevo," the Moslem radio said. The radio added that what Paraga said was the first public statement on the Croatian political scene concerning Tudjman's deliberate delay of his visit to Sarajevo because of being insincere to the Washington agreement.

Unlike Tudjman, Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic was quoted by the HSP as sincerely wanting the implementation of the agreement, and this was why he invited Tudjman to Sarajevo again—said the Moslem Radio Sarajevo in its report from Zagreb.

SDA Issues Statement on 'Incidents' in Prozor

AU0405161394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] Prompted by the increasingly frequent incidents on the part of the Jablanica-Prozor road, which is under the control of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], particularly by the brutal attack on women and older Bosniak men that occurred on 2 May, the Executive Council of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] for Jablanica has issued a statement. Fazlo Dervisbegovic reports on the details.

[Begin Dervisbegovic recording] It is obvious that the responsible civilian and military bodies of the Prozor commune are either incapable or unwilling to implement the agreement negotiated and signed by the highest representatives of the Bosniak-Muslim and Croatian peoples. The Jablanica SDA Executive Council is appealing to the citizens of the Jablanica commune and the surrounding area to refrain from going for supplies to the area of the Prozor commune. Second, we demand—the statement of the SDA Executive Council reads—that all the state bodies in the Jablanica commune—the civilian authorities, military structures, and police stations—put their maximum effort into preventing and eliminating all forms of black marketeering and other criminal activities in the area of the Jablanica commune. Third, we suggest that the appropriate civilian authorities and other structures indefinitely suspend the issuing of permits for trips to the area of the Jablanica commune, and fourth, we condemn the UN Protection Force's very passive attitude to the events in Prozor on 2 May 1994, when our fellow citizens sought their protection.

With the aim of shedding light on these events and their background, the Jablanica SDA Executive Council wishes to inform the general public, the appropriate republican institutions, and the [word indistinct] of the SDA of Bosnia-Herzegovina, reads the statement of the Jablanica SDA Executive Council. [end recording]

Radio Reports Cease-Fire Violations in Gorazde

AU0505105194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 5 May 94

[Report by Fahrudin Becic from Gorazde]

[Text] Several rounds of barrage fire from an anti-aircraft machinegun landed on the central parts of the town last night. The chetniks were frequently firing provocatively with small arms at the defense lines on the left bank of the Drina River. They also fired grenades. The outskirts of the free territory were shelled occasionally.

Somewhat more intensive shelling by the aggressor's artillery took place on the sector of the front toward Foca and Pale. The situation on the right bank of the Drina River has not changed since the arrival of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force]. The chetniks are still in the same positions. The looting has more or less been completed. UNPROFOR units are still without precise orders and authority. Two UN helicopters landed in Gorazde this morning. After a brief stop they left toward Sarajevo. It is said unofficially that General Rose paid a visit to the members of the peacekeeping units.

British UN Convoy Arrives at Gorazde

AU0505104194 Paris AFP in English 1002 GMT 5 May 94

[Text] Zagreb, May 5 (AFP)—A British UN convoy blocked since Saturday by Bosnian Serb forces finally arrived in the Moslem enclave of Gorazde early Thursday after the Serbs gave a go-ahead, a UN forces spokesman here said. The 51-vehicle convoy carrying 168 UN peackeepers entered the enclave around 0115 (2315 GMT), said UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokesman Yvon Desjardins. The British company will reinforce some 500 UN troops already controlling the NATO exclusion zone and ceasefire around the hard- hit enclave.

It left Sarajevo Saturday but was stopped at a Serb checkpoint in Rogatica, only 35 kilometers (21 miles) east of the Bosnian capital by Serbs objecting to what they said was excess weapons and cameras. UNPROFOR said Wednesday in Sarajevo it had been forced to bow to Serb demands to remove some of the ammunition and cameras from the convoy.

'Joint Aggressors' Continue Attacks in Bihac

AU0505110594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 5 May 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[Excerpt] The joint aggressors have not stopped attacking the Bihac region. Karadzic's chetniks last night stepped up artillery attacks on the defenders of the Grabez part of the front and the Ggrmusko-Srbljanski plateau. They also started shelling the suburbs and central part of Cazin at 2300. They fired some 20 mortar and howitzer shells.

There was also some shelling on the Bosanska Krupa and Buzim front. Anti-aircraft weapons and heavy machine guns are being used constantly. The paramilitary formations of the Kladusa traitors and rebels have stepped attacks last night and this morning. They are attacking Trzac, Liskovac, Krivaja, and Pecigrad in the Cazin commune, and Todorovo and Varoska Rijeka with 82 mm and 120 mm mortars and guns. [passage omitted]

Muslim Army Seizes 'Important Position'

LD0405211394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 4 May 94

[Excerpt] Soldiers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army have achieved new victories. In a strong counterattack on the Teslic battlefield, they have seized the important position of Velika Karanovica, pushing the Serb enemy far back toward Blatnica. Fierce clashes have been taking place around Mahovski Vrh on the Zavidovici battlefield. The final outcome was the expulsion of the enemy. [passage omitted]

Serb-UN Talks Begin on UN Deployment in Brcko

LD0505105694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1001 GMT 5 May 94

[Text] Brcko, 5 May (TANJUG)—Talks began in Brcko this afternoon on the deployment of UN observers in the region. The UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] delegation to the talks is headed by Sergio de Melo, an assistant to Yasushi Akashi, and the Serb delegation by Dr. Nikola Koljevic, deputy president of the Serb Republic, and Major General Novica Simic, commander of the East Bosnia corps. The talks are also being attended by Miodrag Pajic, president of the Brcko municipal assembly, and by Milenko Vojinovic, deputy in the assembly of the republic of Srpska. Following the talks, the UNPROFOR delergation is expected to tour the confrontation lines and sectors of the frontlines. It is planned that the UNPROFOR delegation will visit the hospital in Brcko, the Interplet enterprise, and some parts of the town.

Bogdanovic Says Attack on Brcko 'Aggression'

LD0405181994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1804 GMT 4 May 94

["Pool item]

[Text] Belgrade, May 4 (TANJUG)—The vice-president of the Yugoslav Chamber of Republics Radmilo Bogdanovic said Wednesday that a possible attack on Brcko (northern Bosnia) would be an aggression because Brcko was a free Serb town in which people lead normal lives with a functioning state and economy. In a statement to TANJUG Bogdanovic warned that Brcko was a "fabricated Gorazde" aimed at cutting off the corridor between the Serb lands and linking the newly-formed Moslem-Croat Federation with Croatia in the north.

In the last few days the Moslem Army has been concentrating its forces in the Brcko area to attack the town and cut off the corridor which links the eastern and western parts of the Bosnian Serb Republic. This was openly admitted Monday by the commander of the Moslem Army Rasim Delic who said that Brcko was the "key to the Bosnian war". Despite this statement many Western media, who had formerly showered the world with untruths about the destruction of the Moslem enclave of Gorazde (eastern Bosnia) and the number of civilians killed there, are now fabricating similar untruths about the Serbs massing forces to attack Brcko, as if the town was not in their control. At the same time, it is insisted, particularily in U.S. Adminsitration circles, that NATO should carry out air strikes on the Serbs if they go into action.

After all the mistakes the international community has admitted to having made and after so many victims and destruction, the world should realize that the war which has been stirred up in the former Yugoslavia and in the Balkans is in nobody's interest, Bogdanovic averted.

Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic said Tuesday in his talks with Special U.N. Envoy Yasushi Akashi that the Serb side was offering a ceasefire in the Brcko region and that it would be implemented unilaterally even if it is not accepted by the Moslems.

Karadzic also agreed to the deployment of U.N. observers on the Serb and Moslem sides in the area to prevent an escalation of the crisis.

German Envoy Presents Credentials to Izetbegovic

AU0405200994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] The ambassador of yet another country—Germany's Johannes Preisinger—today presented his credentials to President of the Presidency Alija Izetbegovic. Senada Cumurovic reports:

[Begin recording] [Cumurovic] Upon receiving the credentials of Dr. Johannes Preisinger, German ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Izetbegovic said:

[Izetbegovic] In you, as an individual, we greet all the German citizens who, through numerous manifestations of a moral and political nature, supported our struggle for freedom, and who, through various types of help extended to our people, stood steadfastly by us. In addition to this, with this act, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has once again proven its indisputable support of our independence and sovereignty. Your country was among the first to recognize us and, in addition to this, before the Serbian and Montenegrin attack, Germany had a clear position and an authentic vision of the tragic developments if the aggression was not prevented by all the means available to the international community. The Federal Republic of Germany is currently a second home to 350,000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Your country has provided shelter to the greatest number of refugees and expelled Bosnians. It is not only numbers that speak of the generosity of the German authorities toward our citizens, but also the way in which our people have been received throughout your country. The economic and legal status of our refugees has been optimally regulated in Germany until conditions are established for their safe return. All this testifies to the fact that Germany is not only great in an economic and political sense, but it means that your country is also great in respect to its choice of social aims. Please convey our gratitude and respect to the president of the republic, Mr. Richard von Weizsaecker, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Bundestag Chairman Rita Suessmuth, and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. Ambassador Preisinger, I welcome you to our country and wish you great success in your mission.

[Cumurovic] Dr. Johannes Preisinger is the 12th ambassador in Bosnia-Herzegovina that has presented his credentials. [end recording]

Ambassador's Plane Hit

AU0405162594 Paris AFP in English 1605 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] Sarajevo, May 4 (AFP)—In a statement released in Bonn prior to news of the gunshots, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel described the despatch of the ambassador as "a further signal of our efforts to bring peace and stability to Bosnia-Herzegovina". An important aspect of the German embassy's work in Sarajevo will be the coordination of public and private humanitarian aid from Germany for the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kinkel said. The government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl has also said it wants to help reconstruction work here as the war ends.

Izetbegovic Comments on Recent Tour of Front

AU0405192394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 4 May 94

[Report on a statement by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, in Sarajevo on 4 May—recorded]

[Text] In the past 10 days, President of the Presidency Alija Izetbegovic has twice toured the Bosnia-Herzegovina free territories. Upon his return to Sarajevo, President Izetbegovic gave a statement to Radio Television Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Izetbegovic] I have made two visits: Last week I visited for four days. This was primarily a visit to the army, and I did not make any civilian tours. I thought that after Gorazde, I ought to tour the fronts, so I went to (?Niksici), the front near (?Niksici), for the first time. After that I toured the front in Olovo, and then went on to Tesanj and Maglaj. On the second occasion—after I returned—[words indistinct] three days, I visited the Kladanj front, which is a very important and hot front. Then I visited the Brcko front, which has recently been frequently mentioned as the probable scene of a future offensive, a massive Serb offensive, and finally, yesterday I visited Mt. Vlasic, the Mt. Vlasic front. [Words indistinct] on the hills themselves, on the 1,700-meter and [word indistinct] high peaks. So, if I were to talk about my impressions, I could say that on the one hand, the morale of the troops is extremely high, considering the circumstances under which the people are fighting. My aim was actually to [words indistinct] under which our units up there are living, because I had been informed that there were great problems with food, accommodation, clothing, ammunition, and so forth. Such problems do exist, but my conclusion—after analyzing the situation in the General Staff, as we did late last night—is that the problems can be solved and we shall begin solving them immediately. Some of the issues we have already solved. Actually, the problem of caring for the families of our troops needs to be solved in a definite and systematic way [words indistinct]. We need to solve the problem of nutrition [words indistinct] of our troops. This problem has so far been more or less

solved in a satisfactory way. It is only lately that certain problems have arisen. After the subject was broached and it was discussed whether this was the obligation of the commune or the Defense Ministry. [sentence as heard] Then we have the issue of attire—clothing and footwear. I believe that we shall soon solve these issues in a satisfactory way, that is, in the conditions under which are troops are fighting. I met many of them, I personally listened to them, I saw what they were being fed, and I visited their sleeping quarters—I believe, for example, that those on Mt. Vlasic are cold in the night, and so forth. Therefore, these problems do exist but we will solve them.

FRY Sends Armor, Personnel to Serbian Forces

AU0405192994 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 27 Apr 94 p 12

[Article by Mario Marusic: "The Serbs Are Advancing"]

[Text] Mostar (from VJESNIK's staff correspondent)—The situation regarding the destroyed town of Gorazde and the Serbs' (non)withdrawal is still vague (because of another example of the international factors agreeing to play the Serbs' game), but, on the other hand, it is increasingly certain that the Bosnian Serbs—even if they forego further attacks on Gorazde—do not intend to give up further conquests of Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to "annex" it to the "republic of Srpska." The concentration of Serbian forces around Gorazde—from the territory of the "FRY" alone, 60 tanks and 80 trucks packed with soldiers came over to Bosnia-Herzegovina—was, unfortunately, just a drop in the ocean considering the scope of last week's Serbian military operations in the area of Brcko, Orasje, and Usora, and, especially surprising (after so many months of cease-fire), on the Mostar-Stolac front lines.

The main brunt of their assault is to be expected in the area of Orasje and [Bosanski] Samac, where the Serbs are constantly applying pressure to expand the corridor (which in its present state cannot guarantee unobstructed passage and connections between "the Serbian lands" to their liking). Eighty tanks that have recently been stationed in Bijeljina (brought from Valjevo and Zajecar) and the presence of a great number of commandos from Nis, provide enough "guarantee" of the seriousness of Serbian intent and inevitability of a new battle for [Bosanska] Posavina. Furthermore, the Serbs even have the nerve to threaten towns on the left bank of the Sava—Slavonski Brod and Zupanja—trying to provoke new conflicts in Croatia as well.

That the Serbs do not consider this war over, although they control two-thirds of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory, is evident from the concentration of forces of the Eastern Herzegovinian Corps (some of whose units are also fighting in Gorazde) and additional units of "volunteers" and the regular Yugoslav Army in the Neretva valley, around Stolac and Mostar. Thus, long since stated Serbian desires to gain access to the sea and to the left bank of the Neretva are again in focus. Daily provocations along the demarcation lines, which sometimes grow into serious attacks, support this thesis. Those attacks became the daily practice after the signing of the Washington Agreement and they have recently escalated, causing panic among Muslims on the left bank of the Neretva.

Naturally, the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats are prepared to fight back and repel the possible Serbian offensive, that is, to defend Mostar and Stolac, if the Serbs threaten the territory under their control, but the Muslim side should be aware of this and change some of its views regarding the Washington Agreement (General Arif Pasalic in Mostar is one of the biggest obstacles to the normalization of relations) if it really wants to form the federation, which, among other things, would also have a joint defense against Serbian aggression.

Croatian Politician Outlines Hopes for Federation

AU0405165894 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Apr 94 p 7

[Interview with Ivo Komsic, leader of the Croatian Peasants' Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina and member of the B-H Presidency, by Ankica Posavljak; place and date not given: "Before the HNV, We Were Fighting Against the Muslims"]

[Text] In Sarajevo delegations of the Croatian republic of Herzeg-Bosna and of the Bosniak-Muslims side have been discussing the appointments to official posts of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the question of who will be president has remained unanswered, despite the fact that the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (that was adopted on 30 March in Sarajevo) stipulates that president ought to be appointed within 30 days of the adoption of the Constitution. Time is running out, but the Croats and Muslims-Bosniaks have not yet been able to agree on which people the president will be chosen from. Even if they eventually agree that the future president should be a Croat, the question remains who will be the president, since the Croatian People's Council [HNV], which was founded in mid-February this year in Sarajevo, although objecting to being referred to as a political party, still has political aspirations regarding the future head of state. Furthermore, 10 days ago the HNV put forward Ivo Komsic, chairman of the Croatian Peasants' Party [HSS] for Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a presidential candidate. This was an occasion to talk with Komsic.

[Posavljak] Unlike your regularly participation in all the negotiations between the Herzegovina Croats and Muslims, always as a member of the Bosniak delegation, you were not present at the latest round of talks?

[Komsic] It was about an agreement between the two governments on economic and humanitarian matters, and I am a member of the Presidency, rather than a minister in the government. Also, it was a meeting of two

parliamentary parties: The Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] and the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], to which I do not belong. I do not know what kind of agreement they will reach, but regardless of what they agree, it is necessary to carry out talks with other parties in the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because not a single deputies' club in the Parliament is homogeneous. Also, one has to reconcile attitudes within the Croatian deputies' club, and within the Muslim-Bosniak deputies' club, because both of them are heterogeneous. They are composed of parties with different orientations.

[Posavljak] You said that the latest round of talks was about an agreement between two parliamentary parties, whose legitimacy had been confirmed by the elections back in 1990. It is obvious that the SDA and the Muslim-Bosniak leadership are making agreements with their partner in power, namely the HDZ. Your HSS is not taken into consideration, is it?

[Komsic] To put forward such arguments is to try to revive the old argument about which party is legitimate, and which has a right to represent the interests of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We feel that such a debate is superfluous, all the more so since the war has changed many things in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and many parties have squandered their legitimacy and legality. The parties may discuss issues and reach agreements, but all the agreements must be reached within their deputies' clubs, while there is also the highest authority—the constituent assembly, where decisions are made by a two-thirds majority. Proposals that are passed in the clubs do not necessarily have to pass in the assembly.

[Posavljak] The HSS was founded as late as last year, so it could not take part in the 1990 elections, but now it is competing for power.

[Komsic] When a party was founded is not important at all. The HSS revived its activities in Bosnia last year, and nobody can deny any party's right to put forward its candidates. The HSS is to be given considerable credit for the accomplishment of peace in Bosnia, even for the achievement of the Washington Agreement and the institution of the constituent assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Contribution to peace is the only measure by which the legitimacy of any political party can be measured. The time has come for the position of certain parties to be determined by evaluating their contribution to peace. The HSS has its deputies' club in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I have to say that a number of HDZ deputies support the work of the HSS.

[Posavljak] Who are those deputies?

[Komsic] I do not want to mention names, but I will corroborate my assertion by saying that a member of the HNV and HSS won the support of a majority of HDZ deputies when the chairman of the Croatian deputies' club was being elected at a previous constituent assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Posavljak] You are promoting the HNV and its candidates although you claim that the HNV is not a political party. What is it then? Is it an association of citizens, and can it be taken as a serious political party as such?

Rift Among Croats

[Komsic] The HNV is an executive body of the Croatian National Assembly that took place in Sarajevo on 6 February this year. That body is struggling for the implementation of the conclusions adopted at the convention, which are absolutely in accord with the Washington Agreement and the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and will struggle for it until everything that has been agreed upon or planned is implemented.

[Posavljak] Did the foundation of the HNV cause a division into loyal and disloyal Croats, that is, to what extent have you contributed to the disintegration of the unity of the Croats at a time when intensive homogenization of the other two peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina is taking place?

[Komsic] If we value the collective interest of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is for peace, I suppose, then there is no need to campaign against the HNV and the people who have brought about peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before the foundation of the HNV and its concept of federation, we had a war between the Croats and the Muslims. The theory about a rift among the Croats is sustained by those who are struggling for power, by those who tried to create a national state for themselves in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and who cannot reconcile themselves to their political defeat. The new Constitution represents their defeat, and now those forces want to achieve power again in order to protect their own interests. As for the Croatian nation here in Bosnia-Herzegovina, those who disintegrated the Croats, who sacrificed half a million Croats for the creation of a Croatian national state in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are now trying to push their policy through the institutions of the Federation. They are trying to revive and deepen the rift that they themselves caused among the the Croats by campaigning against the HNV.

[Posavljak] You keep saying that the HNV has brought about peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that your policy brought about the Washington Agreement as well. However, the representatives of the Croatian republic of Herzeg-Bosna claim the same for themselves, and it is they who signed the document. Who is to be given credit for the accomplishment of the peace agreement between the Croats and Muslim-Bosniaks?

[Komsic] Representatives of the Croatian republic of Herzeg-Bosna stated their attitude at the assembly in Livno, and according to the Livno resolution the Croatian people claims sovereignty and statehood in Herzeg-Bosna, while all other Croats would be protected by international institutions for human rights and freedoms. That means that their resolution declared us to be

a national minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but this concept of theirs as stated in the Livno resolution ultimately failed.

[Posavljak] In view of your attitude that it is precisely the HVN that has preserved the Croats' equality as a nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, how do you interpret certain denunciations on the part of certain groups among the Croatian people, saying that you are a Croatian Sejdo Bajramovic [the Albanian member of the Yugoslav Federal Presidency before the war]

[Komsic] I can only say that history will answer many questions.

In Politics—Out of Necessity

[Posavljak] The HNV has already announced its criteria that the candidates for federal posts should meet. One of those criteria is that none of the candidates should ever have been involved in the Croatian-Muslim war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Are there any such people among the current politicians at all? I refer thereby also to you and to Stjepan Kljujic, member of the Bosnian Presidency, because the Croats in central Bosnia consider you to be indirect participants in the conflict, but on the Muslim side?

[Komsic] Those are insinuations, and in proposing these criteria we referred to the people who were actively involved in the conflict either as protagonists, or through the media, generating hatred between the two peoples.

[Posavljak] Are your attitudes and explanations supported by the Croats in central Bosnia, where you yourself come from, and would you dare visit your native town of Kiseljak now, convinced of the correctness of your policy?

[Komsic] An unpredictable danger in such places not only for me, but also for other people, lies in uniformed groups or individuals who have broken loose from any control. Those who are under the control of or subordinated to the General Staff of the Croatian Defense Council represent no danger for any of us, which means for me as well. I travelled enough during the war throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I stayed in Grude, Citluk, and Capljina without any fear.

[Posavljak] You also said that the HNV put the blame for the conflict on those who had generated hatred between the peoples by waging a media war. One of the elements of the Washington Agreement stipulates the urgent cessation of the media war. While listening to Sarajevo Radio these days I have noticed that the Croats are still referred to as Ustashas. Do you feel uncomfortable when you hear that the official, state-run media refer to your people in such a way?

[Komsic] I have already made many public statements about the terminology used, which is quite unbecoming to the media. After all, the Ustasha movement was never in conflict with the Muslims, and never supported the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, because of the fascist connotation that the term conveys, we disagree with the use of it. It is incorrect rather than offensive.

[Posavljak] What will happen to your political career if the HDZ and the SDA reach an agreement? Do you see any political future for yourself if Herzeg-Bosna's candidate becomes president?

[Komsic] My engagement in politics has resulted from necessity, from the need for the protection of Croatian interests in the region. I am not worried about my political career because I have never aimed at one. Everything that I have done has been out of necessity, to save what could be saved, and now we want the consensus between Muslims and Croats to be preserved through the implementation of the Constitution.

[Posavljak] Still, you have not given up your candidacy for the future president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Komsic] My candidacy for one of the leading offices in the Federation was announced by the HNV some 10 days ago, while other things will be determined in the course of negotiations.

[Posavljak] With respect to your attitude that everything that you are doing is for the benefit of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, would you give up your presidential candidacy if the Croatian interest demanded that?

[Komsic] Yes, because it is all about the implementation of the project of Federation, and if somebody else were to implement it, I would be very happy.

Biographies of Bosnian Croat Leaders

94BA0255A Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 1 Apr 94 pp 12-13

[Article by Mate Basic: "Col. Dragan Vikic Against Commander Tuto Naletilic"]

[Text] Archbishop Vinko Puljic, his assistant Bishop Petar Sudar, Police Colonel Dragan Vikic, Ivo Komsic, president of the HNV [Croatian National council], Col. Gen. Ante Roso, and Kresimir Zubak, president of the Croat-Muslim Federation, are men with different professional and political careers in the past and altogether different beliefs. But they are bound together by an extremely important feature they have in common: They are the most distinguished representatives of the new Croatian policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, through whose conduct they are to confirm that Croats sincerely desire to maintain the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, without at the same time jeopardizing the most vital Croatian national interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The media have been saying in recent weeks that the signing of the Washington agreement was an expression of the continuity of Croatian policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina and that there has been a radical departure

from what until recently were the official views of Zagreb and Grude, which is more than clear.

The departure of Mate Boban, M.A., the top man in the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna, was symbolic of the change that occurred in most of the political elite of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Croats, which until recently advocated a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and strove to settle the conflict with the Muslims by military means.

The Croat-Muslim agreement also thrust into the foreground certain Croats who until recently were either marked as "traitors to the Croatian cause" or were marginalized or had come into politics only quite recently.

Kresimir Zubak, the Most Important Representative of the Interests of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina

What we wanted above all in choosing new representatives of the Croatian people in Bosnia was to sketch out the new currents in Croatian policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kresimir Zubak, who succeeds Mate Boban at the head of Herceg-Bosna Croats, is chairman of the presidential council of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, a candidate for president of the future federation, and until recently the vice president of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] of Herceg-Bosna, who says that it is not contrary to the Croatian interest even for the Serbs to join the federation. He was born 29 November 1947 in Doboj. A lawyer by profession, he at one time held the office of president of the basic court in Doboj. He has also been assistant secretary in the B-H Secretariat for Jurisprudence and General Administration, and he was justice minister in the government of Herceg-Bosna. When the Serbs attacked Usora, where the alliance with the Muslims was never in question at any time, Zubak went from Doboj to that small Croatian enclave, where he was in fact wounded as an HVO fighter. Zubak, who says that creation of the republic of Herceg-Bosna was necessary to organize the army and the government, turned up as the most important representative of the interests of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina in negotiations with the Muslims about creation of the Bosnian federation.

Ante Roso, Ardent Catholic and Defender of the Law

Col. Gen. Ante Roso, chief of the general staff of the Croatian Defense Council, is the principal Croat military negotiator with the Muslims, who are represented by Gen. Rasim Delic of the B-H Army. An extremely impressive person, informed people say, his approach won over even the side that was an adversary until recently. A 42-year-old noncommissioned officer in the Foreign Legion, married to a French woman and the owner of a private firm in France, he had retired after 21 years in France's most elite military unit, but at the very outset of the Serbian aggression against Croatia he returned to the homeland. Having been a fighting man in the Legion's 2d Airborne Regiment, in Croatia he worked first as a military instructor, and then he commanded special units of the Croatian Army.

Roso has fought on all fronts in Croatia, and he has been fiercely attacked in the Muslim and Serbian media because of the defense of Croatian towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina he organized (both when they were being attacked by the Serbs and when they were being attacked by the Muslims). An ardent Catholic, he headed the first Croatian military delegation to the shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes.

When Gen. Slobodan Praljak was removed from the head of the Croatian Defense Council, Roso went to Herceg-Bosna from the Croatian Army. His arrival halted the Muslim offensive in central Bosnia, in areas where the HVO has experienced the greatest defeats. At the same time the peace negotiations began with the Muslims.

Gen. Roso also enjoys confidence in Herzegovina because of his firm decision to organize the HVO according to strict military rules and to halt the lawlessness which had prevailed until recently in that area.

Zeljko Glasnovic, Legionnaire From the Gulf War

Professional Guards brigades of the HVO are also being organized under the command of Gen. Roso in Orasje, Vitez, Tomislavgrad, and Capljina. Brig. Zeljko Glasnovic, commander of the Ante Bruno Busic 1st Guards Brigade, housed in the Bozan Simovic Garrison in Capljina, is a 40-year-old Croat who was born in Zagreb, but his family moved to Canada when he was eight. One of the best-known members of the Foreign Legion, he returned to the homeland in 1991 to oppose the Serbian aggression. He spent five years in the Canadian army, he fought in Central America, and in the Legion, with the rank of a noncommissioned sergeant—he also fought in the Gulf war. He speaks several foreign languages, he is an instructor of infantry warfare on all terrains, and he is an expert on armor-piercing weapons, mountain climbing and scout training, and antiguerrilla warfare. Like the other Legionnaires, Glasnovic trained members of special military forces in Kumrovec, and later he advocated the English type of discipline and the Israeli method of waging war in the Croatian armed forces.

Dragan Vikic, Living Legend of the Bosnian Resistance

Col. Dragan Vikic, commander of the antiterrorist unit of the B-H MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], is a Croat from Sarajevo, the first man who came to the defense of the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina; he became distinguished in the media when in April 1992, wearing a camouflage uniform and holding a rifle, he appeared on television to appeal to the citizens to oppose the Serbs with weapons. Even before that, when he and his men captured 1,500 rifles in Gorazde which were being transported by truck, supposedly to the garrison in Visoko, but actually for chetnik units in Croatia, the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] decided to pursue Vikic and punish him.

This former Yugoslav judo champion and organizer of special police units in Bosnia-Herzegovina has served

under three ministers of internal affairs during this war: Alija Delimustafic, who is said to have been working closely with Aca Vasiljevic, former chief of the JNA KOS [counterintelligence service], Jusuf Pusina, during whose tenure a warrant was issued for Delimustafic's arrest, and Bakir Alispahic, who is the minister at the moment.

Mladen "Tifa" Vojicic, who formerly was the vocalist for the group Belo Dugme, recorded a TV spot about Vikic, living legend of Bosnian resistance, at the height of the war. During the fiercest shelling of Sarajevo that spot echoed from loudspeakers in city streets in spite of the Serbian artillery from the hills.

As the leader of the effort to rid the city of snipers and the principal participant in the capture of the Holiday Inn, which snipers were using to kill people on the street, carried live over television, and a man whose entire family has spent the war in the Sarajevo settlement of Dobrinja, he has been the target of accusations not only by the Serbs, but also the Croats and Muslims. Because of the Muslim charges (among other things, they say that he was the one who allowed Bruno Stojic and Branko Kvesic, former security chiefs of Herceg-Bosna, to drive brand new all-terrain vehicles of the MUP to Herzegovina). Vikic, some say, is today under the command of Kemal Ademovic, who heads all the special police units of the B-H MUP and who was his deputy at the beginning of the war. In Herceg-Bosna they call Vikic an "Alija's Croat," and the well-informed in Herzegovina say that along with Sefer Halilovic he took part in the Muslim offensive against Dreznica, and that he was even wounded there. In spite of everything, today Col. Vikic is considered a promising police professional from the ranks of the Bosnian Croats.

Stjepan Siber, Future Military Attache or Pensioner

Stjepan Siber is the most distinguished Croat in the ranks of the B-H Army. Siber is therefore hated among advocates of the "Herzegovina policy." At the outset of the Serbian aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, he and Jovan Divjak began to organize defense of the city and republic on the invitation of the legal authorities. This former officer of the JNA (he once served in Zagreb, birthplace of his son Boris, one of the stars of "Hit Parade of Surrealists"), and he also worked in the B-H Territorial Defense. From the outset of creation of the B-H Army to the present day Siber has supposedly been the second man in the B-H Army. Born in Brcko, with an apartment in the Sarajevo settlement of Grbavica (still under Serb occupation in a neighborhood predominantly inhabited by officers of the JNA), Siber obtained the rank of general in the B-H Army. Although followers of Izetbegovic's line never denied him credit for recruiting personnel trained in the JNA for the army that was being organized, Siber was not given a chance to break through to the top position in the Bosnian army (Jovan Divjak, Sefer Halilovic, and Rasim Delic succeeded one another in that post at the time). At the time of the conflict between the HVO and the B-H Army, the commanders of the HVO refused to negotiate with him: One reason was that he was "second-in-command," and the other that he was a Croat fighting on the side of the Muslims. Back when Rusmir Mahmutcehajic called for Muslims to withdraw from the HVO, Siber opposed him, asking whether that meant he also, as a Croat, should leave the B-H Army!

Well-informed people have two thoughts about Siber's future: Some say he will have the role of a military attache abroad, and others feel that he has a pension waiting for him.

Dr. Ivo Komsic, Integralist of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Dr. Ivo Komsic, like Siber (in the army) and Vikic (in the police), is numbered among the integralists of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This Croat from Kiseljak, full professor in the School of Political Science at Sarajevo University, was once executive secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the election Komsic emerged as vice president of the SDP [Socialist Democratic Party], which was headed by Nijaz Durakovic. Komsic later founded the Croatian Peasant Party [HSS] of B-H. He established himself as an opponent of the policy of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] and the Herzegovina current, and, like the other Croats of Sarajevo—whose most distinguished representative was Stjepan Kljuic—he came to be referred to as an "Alija's Croat." This man, who is today chairman of the Croatian National Council and a member of the B-H Presidency, reached the pinnacle of politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time of the preliminary negotiations concerning the Croat-Muslim agreement, says himself that "all the illegal institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina that have sprung up during this war are ceasing to exist, and there exists only the integral Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Vinko Puljic and Petar Sudar, Those Who Deserve the Most Credit for the New Direction of Croatian Policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina

As far as church circles are concerned, many people believe that Monsignor Vinko Puljic, archbishop of Sarajevo, and Petar Sudar, his assistant, deserve the most credit for the new direction of Croatian policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sudar was born in Neretvica, and he took his doctorate in theology in the Vatican.

Like Franjo Topic, president of the Croatian cultural society Napredak [Progress], Sudar's political commitment can best be seen through the work of that institution, which represents the typical "Sarajevo-Croatian view" towards resolution of the crisis of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Critics of Puljic's and Sudar's policy will say that their views of the nationality question is most evident in the activity of their Radio Station Vrhbosna, which at the beginning of the war was carrying the reports of Croatian Radio, and then, when the Croat-Muslim conflicts broke out, it suddenly renounced them.

Monsignor Vinko Puljic, archbishop of Sarajevo, head of one of the six Catholic archepiscopates on Croatian territory, is an outspoken advocate of integralism in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Puljic once said: "The Serbs are backed by the Russians, the French, the English, and to some extent the Chinese; the Muslims are backed by the Islamic countries and the United States; but we Croats are backed only by the Holy [passage illegible] in 1945, as the 12th of 15 children in the family, in Prijecani, which is near Banja Luka. In 1961 he arrived at the Boys' Seminary on Salata in Zagreb. He studied theology in Djakovo, where in 1970 he took orders to become a priest. He spent three years at this first pastoral post in Banja Luka. He spent five years (1973-78) in Ravska, which is near the Ljubija Mine, and then he was transferred to the post of priest in the Boys' Seminary in Zadar, where he remained for the next 10 years. In that year, 1988, he was appointed parish priest in Nova Gradiska, and in 1990 he became vice rector of the Sarajevo Seminary. In January 1991 he succeeded Monsignor Ciril Kos in the post of archbishop of Sarajevo.

RSK Ready To Resume Talks With Croatia

LD0405201594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1916 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, 4 May (TANJUG)—Milan Babic, foreign minister of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], conveyed to Geert Ahrens, deputy cochairman of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Serb side's readiness to continue negotiations on the normalization of relations between the RSK and Croatia.

Babic said that the RSK proposed Turanj or Geneva as a site for the negotiations. We believe that it is necessary to conduct negotiations in a place that is not beset by political tensions, so we suggest Turanj, a place under the control of the UN peace force in the buffer zone where peace has already been restored, Babic said in a statement to Politika TV.

He stressed that Turanj is accessible to both representatives of the RSK and the Croatian Government—something that is an extra advantage given the fact that at this stage of negotiations frequent meetings of technical and expert groups would be needed.

Babic also says that the Serb side was today presented with a document by the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, headlined "The Program of Economic Affairs," although it was not discussed since today's meeting was by and large focused on the question of when and where these negotiations were going to take place.

Following the meeting Ahrens said that the atmosphere at the talks with the RSK foreign minister was excellent and that the talks would resume next week.

Ahrens added that the Croatian side was also completely ready to resume negotiations and that some minor details had yet to be decided upon prior to the second phase of negotiations.

Martic Welcomes Crisis Conference

LD0405162594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1448 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, 4 May (TANJUG)—In his letter to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], welcomes Butrus-Ghali's initiative for a new international conference on the former Yugoslavia.

In his letter the RSK president writes that the war in the former Yugoslavia and all its horrible consequences could have been averted had there been more understanding and a better insight into the historic causes of the crisis in former Yugoslavia in 1990 and 1991.

"At that time Europe's most powerful countries unfortunately supported the creation of an ethnic community's state on the territory of other ethnic communities, so that the territories of the new states on the soil of the former Yugoslavia corresponded with the artificial states designed by Nazi Germany in 1941," the letter states. It also notes that "in both cases, old Serbian lands were incorporated into the states of Muslims and Croats, while the Serbs were condemned to death, persecution, and assimilation."

Martic recalls the European principles articulated by the Badinter arbitration commission, which told the peoples of former Yugoslavia that the international community would recognize the new states, provided they met the following conditions: they should have a territory, a population, and they should exercise legislative authority on that territory.

"The Republic of Croatia was recognized, including the territory of the republic of Serb Krajina, where Croatia does not exercise legislative authority; nor does this territory belong to the Croatian ethnic community. The population that used to live there was not Croatian either," Martic adds.

The right to self-determination, however, has not only been acknowledged as an exclusive right of the Serbian nation, the letter to the UN secretary general says.

These facts were ignored in 1990 and 1991, as well as later on in the work of the international conference on former Yugoslavia, which, according to Martic, resulted in the escalation of the war between the Serbs and the Croats, the Serbs and the Muslims, and later between the Muslims and the Croats.

Reminding the UN secretary general about the persecution of the Serbs in Croatia during World War II, when some 1,250,000 Serbs perished, as well as about data on Serbs murdered in and expelled from Croatia over the past four years, Martic stressed he does not believe the secretary general and other officials in the world could afford to ignore the republic of Serb Krajina.

"Serb Krajina must be included in the work of the new international conference on former Yugoslavia, which you intend to organize. The republic of Serb Krajina, albeit unrecognized, is nevertheless a factor in international relations, and is subject to international law. On 29 March this year it signed an agreement with the Republic of Croatia and was thus recognized as a warring side. It has the full right to take part in agreements on setting up future relations between the new states created on the territory of former Yugoslavia," RSK president Milan Martic concludes in his letter to Butrus-Ghali.

RSK Says Croats Violating Cease-Fire

LD0405192594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1904 GMT 4 May 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Knin, May 4 (TANJUG)—Senior military official of the Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.) General Mile Novakovic warned on Wednesday that patrols and reconnaissance groups of the Croatian Army

in the area of Northern Dalmatia ("Sector South") occasionally entered the buffer zone and so violated an agreement between the R.S.K. and Croatia on the cessation of hostilities and on the disengagement of forces.

General Novakovic, president of the R.S.K. Committee for the Implementation of the Agreement, informed the head of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) observer team, General Bastijans, about this during their talks in Knin, the political center of the R.S.K.

The talks were initiated by General Bastijans, General Novakovic told TANJUG.

Novakovic added that General Bastijans was warned about the Croatian Army transports in the zones subject to transport control, and about the presence of Croatian heavy weapons in the areas covered by the agreement.

The agreement, which took effect on April 4, provides for the two warring sides to withdraw their infantry one kilometer from the disengagement line and for UNPROFOR members to enter the buffer zone. It also provides for the R.S.K. and Croatia to pull out their heavy weaponry (mortars) 10 km and artillery and tanks 20 km from the front line.

According to General Novakovic, it was specified during the talks that U.N. military observers were the only ones in charge of control of the implementation of the agreement on the Croatian side.

Novakovic said they agreed during the talks that U.N. military observers were obliged to uncover possible preparations of the Croatian side for any military actions. The ceasefire agreement envisages such an obligation, which was not in the UNPROFOR mandate before this agreement.

The military observers pointed out they did not want to be remembered by failing to accomplish their mission, said General Novakovic.

The R.S.K. was formed in 1991 in the territory of Croatia populated by the Serbs in response to Croatia's secession from the former Yugoslavia and its attempt to reduce the status of Serb people to that of a national minority. The R.S.K. was proclaimed a U.N. Protected Area (UNPA) in March 1992.

IDS President Jakovcic on 'Crisis' With State

AU0405115194 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 25 Apr 94 p 5

[Interview with Ivan Jakovcic, president of the Istrian Democratic Congress, by Davor Ivankovic; place and date not given: "We Want Counties After Radic's Model"]

[Text] *At the time of the most severe crisis so far between Istria and the central state authorities, the Fifth Special Convention of the Istrian Democratic Congress [IDS], the number one Istrian party, was held in Rovinj. At the convention, four declarations were issued that will become IDS program material and in which the main IDS regionalist orientations are listed. It is clear from the text of the declarations that the IDS has taken a new, clearer, and more open course toward the accomplishment of the autonomy of Istria. We talked about this with the party president Ivan Jakovcic.*

[Ivankovic] Why was the Fifth IDS Convention a special convention?

[Jakovcic] Because the regular ones are held every two years, and this one was programmatic. The IDS has adopted many important documents relating to our specific political aim. The most important thing is that it was a dignified meeting of people who hold similar views and who want good for our state. Those who expected a spectacular development of events at this convention, and who, even before it took place, threatened Istria with the army and police, are now politically defeated in this area.

This Is Not Autonomism

[Ivankovic] Many will say that the declarations you have adopted (on Istria being a European region, on the autonomous County of Istria, on the democratization of the Republic of Croatia, and on the regional organization of the Republic of Croatia) display clear and evident autonomism.

[Jakovcic] This has nothing to do with autonomism, because autonomism is a concept of political activities aimed at breaking up a state, whereas we are building Croatia and proposing a new vision of Croatia to the citizens of Croatia. If Croatia were organized through its historical regions of Istria, Dalmatia, Slavonia and Baranja, Medjimurje, Zagorje, Lika, and so on, it would be completely normal if these regions had a certain status. Some regions could have autonomy, and some could have other statuses, instead of what the Croatian authorities have, judging by indications, agreed to, which is the confederalization of Croatia, and which it has been forced into because it was incapable of forming a different territorial organization. The autonomy of the individual, a group, a town, region, or municipality is something that is based on subsidiarity, which is the basis of Christian democracy. Those who wish to call themselves a Christian democratic party in Croatia do not in fact understand what it means.

[Ivankovic] One gets the impression that, by adopting the declarations, you have achieved what you had not dared even put into the suspended Statute. What is the formal and legal significance of these documents?

[Jakovcic] The declarations are the expression of our political wishes, of our will; they are the expression of what we intend to achieve through the institutions of the system. There are no possibilities and there is no need for the IDS to proclaim anything or do anything independently as long as the democratic system is in power. As long as the Croatian Parliament, the government, and

the president are functioning, there will be democratic institutes, which are what goals should be achieved through. This is the direction our proposals for constitutional laws, built on the basis of these declarations, follow. We have observed the democratic procedure. Naturally, our proposals for constitutional laws will be put on the agenda of the Croatian Parliament only when the majority in the Croatian Parliament is behind our proposal. Therefore, with these documents we followed what we presented to President Tudjman at Brijuni late last summer, except now the highest IDS group stands behind them.

The Constitution Once and Now...

[Ivankovic] These documents now state in writing your demands for a region, not county, for legislative power, most of the direct revenue....

[Jakovcic] Naturally. These proposals ensue from two basic postulates—getting to know about the European organization and the desire to organize Croatia after the model of Austrian and Italian regions, which is still far from the achievements of the German and Swiss types of federalism. The most beautiful caryatid of this idea is based on [Stjepan] Radic's treatment of Croatian counties, on his text of the Constitution dating from the early Twenties, in which he anticipates the counties to, I quote, "pass regulations that have the validity of laws." We must oppose those who now want to suspend Radic's positions!

[Ivankovic] However, everything you are demanding contradicts the existing Croatian Constitution.

[Jakovcic] The declarations we have adopted do not have this Croatian Constitution as a starting point. Our task, as the task of any other political party, is to fight for the achievement of our political aims in a democratic way. On the other hand, a change of the Constitution and the laws is to be expected, and this is our political aim, but it is not the only one. We are also asking for the change of the super-presidential political system; we want a parliamentary system in which the parliament and the government will have autonomy.

We Want Early Elections

[Ivankovic] It would be difficult to expect that your party will ever be in power in Croatia, except maybe in a coalition. Have you discussed these programmatic wishes with possible party partners in Croatia, and have they supported them?

[Jakovcic] We have recently witnessed a great stratification in the political life of Croatia, especially over the past few weeks. The balance of political power is changing rapidly; stratification has occured in literally all Croatian political parties. Evidently it is necessary to consider early elections. I am sure that they will facilitate a different balance of power in the Croatian Parliament, which will provide the opportunity for the IDS to get closer to participating in the central state authorities! This is our aim and our wish. As far as the disposition of political parties regarding our political program is concerned, I must say that it is to be expected that our ideas will not be welcomed with open arms. However, the achieving of political aims is also a result of compromise and interests, of the balance of powers at the appropriate moment.

[Ivankovic] Could it be concluded that this new course coincides with the crisis at the top of Croatian politics?

[Jakovcic] No! The interpretations that say we want to strike at the moment the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] is weak are wrong. We were supposed to adopt these documents at the party convention in February, in Pazin, but we were not able to do so due to the events in our party. We convened this one a month and a half ago.

[Ivankovic] One of the declarations mentions a territorial expansion of Istria. You state that Opatija, Cres, Mali Losinj, Matulji, Moscenicka Draga, and other towns also belong to you.

[Jakovcic] This is our well-known political position. It is not surprising, as our party is in power in that area; it is certainly also because of that part of our program that we gained the trust of the people there. If a referendum were to be held in these areas, they would certainly join the County of Istria, and it is our duty to let them express their positions, if nothing else. Naturally, nothing will be done by force, as was the case with the territorial organization of Croatia, when these regions were left out of the territory of our county exclusively because the people were against the HDZ, the local HDZ.

[Ivankovic] Would you explain the position stated in the declarations that a referendum is more valid than the decisions made by the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia?

[Jakovcic] Take the confederation, which is a topical issue, for instance. It is unacceptable to the IDS that a decision on, say, joining a confederation with any state is made in parliament. That has to be the result of a referendum.

A Referendum for Changes

[Ivankovic] This position on referendums does not relate to Istria then?

[Jakovcic] No, it would not mean that, for instance, a referendum in Istria would be more powerful than the decisions made by the Croatian Parliament. But, while we are on the subject of a referendum in Istria, I believe that referendums should be held when there is a wish for change, rather than imposing something. This does not only relate to Istria, but to the whole of Croatia.

[Ivankovic] There have been estimates that this is the most severe crisis in the relations between Istria and the central authorities ever.

[Jakovcic] I would not say this was the most severe crisis; the issue is only the continuity of the politics toward Istria that has now started to show its cards, having stated that it can consolidate its positions in Istria with the police and army, which is crazy! Except for the raised voice, there is nothing new there. The fact is that the reputation of Croatian leadership is at present the worst since we have had the multiparty system!

[Ivankovic] How do you think things will develop regarding the suspension of the Statute of the County of Istria?

[Jakovcic] It is difficult to predict, as circumstances change very quickly, and the judiciary in Croatia is obviously not independent. Ivic Pasalic's statement that "judges should implement the state policies" is a clear indication of that. The Statute may be suspended, but it will not change the policies of the IDS, the County Assembly, and, least of all, of our people.

[Ivankovic] Is the statute unconstitutional or not?

[Jakovcic] Absolutely not! It would be fair if those who have been trying to have it suspended return it, so it can be seen if there is anything that could perhaps be altered. Regardless of that, I am sure we will be able to prove that our statute complies with the Constitution and the laws.

[Ivankovic] Is there a danger of a commission being appointed in Istria, thus blocking the local authorities and introducing a kind of "state of emergency"?

[Jakovcic] If that were to happen, it would represent the definite end of the politics that subsists on conflicts anyway, and as it gets difficult to find enemies, they are now found in Istria. The appointment of the Council for Istria and the announcement of the suspension of our statute happening at the same time is no coincidence. The party in power wants to mitigate its own crisis through the media, and is therefore now trying to concentrate everything on Istria.

Osimo Is Out of Date

[Ivankovic] Does it not seem to you now, after President Tudjman asked that more people be appointed to the Council for Istria, that his approach is more flexible?

[Jakovcic] This move was made at the moment it became clear that the Council could fall apart, which would have been a great discredit to those who founded the Council. If the task of the Council was presenting the positions of the IDS and the citizens of Istria to the president of the Republic, it would be acceptable. However, that is evidently not the case.

[Ivankovic] You have now stated in the documents what you had only talked about before, which is that Istria is left with only two-thirds of the direct revenue, while one third goes to the state.

[Jakovcic] That is the political position in principle, to establish exactly what the direct revenue is, which would be in accordance with the authorizations. The state would thus have the basic attributes of statehood, which each region would have to finance, and the regions would have a financial base. It is really absurd that towns now have much greater budgets than the counties they are in.

[Ivankovic] What is your interpretation of the political situation in Italy and the demands regarding our territory?

[Jakovcic] There are neofascists everywhere. The Serbs have them—they want Greater Serbia; there are those who talk of a banner on the Romanija, and then there are those who say that Istria and Dalmatia are Italian. I am sure that the new Italian Government will not consider these ideas of changing the borders. At any rate, the IDS will be the first to oppose any possibility of changing the borders, as every change of borders in Istria always had a tragic end.

[Ivankovic] What about the annexes to the Osimo Accords?

[Jakovcic] They are simply necessary, as the Accords are out of date. Croatia, Slovenia, and Italy should start constructive talks. I would like to ask the authorities to include us, who have a direct interest in it, in the process.

[Box 1, p 5]

Istria as a European Region

[Ivankovic] One of the declarations you have adopted is the Declaration on Istria as a European Region, consisting of Croatian municipalities, three Slovenian ones, and one Italian. You have proposed that Porec be the center of the region.

[Jakovcic] The concept of the organization of the European region is similar to those of which there are about 40 in the European Union, and it was drawn up with the hope that Croatia and Slovenia aspire to the European Union. This final draft of the declaration shows that no one here wants either an Istrian Republic or state, as is said in the accusations of the neofascists in Croatia, but that we want the free movement of people, capital, and ideas on the territory where it has always worked. I hope that it will be met with understanding in the Croatian, Slovene, and Italian Parliaments. When Croatia is accepted at the Council of Europe, we will present this as a clear demand.

[Box 2, p 5]

Demilitarization

[Ivankovic] You have demanded that Istria be a demilitarized zone.

[Jakovcic] Our position that ladies in print pants rather than uniformed soldiers should walk around Istria is well known. This is not possible to regulate at present due to the semiwar situation our state is in, but of Istria it is both an objective need and a possibility. We would like

to remind those who say we are asking for this because the Istrians do not want to serve in the Croatian Army and participate in safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of Croatia, that even the highest officials of the Ministry of Defense have established that the degree of positive response to mobilization in Croatia was by far the highest in Istria, and that our boys behave in a highly disciplined way at the frontlines.

Defense Minister Comments on Criticisms

AU0505111194 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 27 Apr 94 pp 6-7

[Interview with Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak by Stipe Pudja; place and date not given: "I Was Prepared To Resign Because of Duboki Jarak!"]

[Text] Gojko Susak, defense minister of the Republic of Croatia, is the only Croatian minister who has been a member of all five Croatian governments so far. Although he enjoys the support and is respected by his ministry as well as by the Croatian Army, Minister Susak, together with President Tudjman, was one of the most criticized men of the Croatian state leadership by the opposition. We talked to Minister Susak about that as well as about the latest withdrawals from the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of the President of the Chamber of Representatives Stipe Mesic and the President of the Chamber of Counties Josip Manolic.

At the beginning of the interview, we asked him about the latest events in the ruling party, and Minister Susak, who is also the vice president of the HDZ, said:

[Susak] I personally think the present process in the party is extremely positive. In the evolution of the Croatian state, we entered the political scene as a movement which, in due course, must grow into a party whose views and guidelines were publicly and clearly set by President Tudjman at the Second General Assembly of the HDZ. We voted and agreed to ratify the party program and people who will implement it. Such phenomena are normal in all parties in the world, not to mention our process of transformation from a movement into a party. I do not see it as a rift, nor as a cause for panic in the party. I think, and so do most HDZ members, that, after they [Mesic and Manolic] leave, the membership of the HDZ will be even stronger. Therefore, I believe this will prompt a large number of people of quality to join the HDZ.

[Pudja] Leaving the HDZ, Mr. Manolic and Mr. Mesic were very critical of your work at the Ministry of Defense. What do you think about that and is this constructive criticism?

[Susak] In the past year, and it will probably be so for a while, the Defense Ministry has been one of the most important departments, but also one of the most controversial ones, owing to the global political and military situation of the Republic of Croatia. And it is only natural that both the Defense Ministry and myself are subject to criticism regardless of whether it is well-founded or not. Criticism is always welcome. The fact is that we are now in the position that every citizen, regardless of his or her function, can voice his or her opinion. We advocated that right and our army fought to preserve our territory and such a system. However, criticism is also subject to analysis. Those who criticize the Ministry of Defense and especially myself as the key man of the Ministry, must substantiate their accusations with some proof. I am willing to face the Croatian public, let them analyze the situation if they want, even with the help independent experts, from the moment I took office at the Ministry to the present. That does not justify my mistakes, if there were any, and I must have made some, as I am only human. However, I am willing to face the judgment of the public and of experts and let them evaluate my work and results. Let me remind you that, recently, during a session of the parliament, there was an attempt to call for a vote of no confidence in me. I think that voting for a vote of confidence or no confidence in me in the parliament in free and independent Croatia would be the most exhilarating moment. That would be the system I fought for and I would be honored, regardless of the outcome of voting. I will use this opportunity to ask my party to agree to that.

Former Intelligence Services

[Pudja] You have not quite answered my question. Do you know why Manolic, in addition to referring to President Tudjman, most often refers to you personally? Is there, perhaps, something we do not know?

[Susak] Yes, but in Mr. Manolic's frame of mind, which is probably the result of his life-long orientation and experience, which does not correspond to Croatian views and the road Croatia was supposed to take. He chose his own path and the Croatian public will have their say about that and decide whether his way is better than what I advocate. After all, there will be more elections and we will see the judgment of the Croatian nation.

[Pudja] Could you comment on the fact that some people from the ruling party are founding a new party? As those men are the presidents of the two chambers of the parliament, could this result in a parliamentary crisis and malfunctioning of the state?

[Susak] Our party itself could not have chosen a better moment for such an event. The HDZ has not for a single moment, in the past four years of its existence, been in a better position to solve such problems. The international and domestic situation in Croatia has never been safer or more stable. The fact that their timing is bad points to their political naivete. If their plan was to provoke and destabilize the system and disrupt the functioning of the state, my opinion is that they could not have chosen a worse moment. But that is their choice and we will accept the challenge. We will not deal with them the way they dealt with their enemies while they had power in the former regime. From the beginning, we advocated a

Croatia whose every citizen will be able to air his or her views, whatever they may be.

[Pudja] At the meeting in Dubrovnik, you also brought up three of Manolic's followers—Boljkovac, Karic, and Degoricija—as they were members of former intelligence services and you said the HDZ would get stronger after they leave.

[Susak] Regarding the said gentlemen, we know they come from similar structures and have similar views. At the beginning, the HDZ was organized as a movement comprising all kinds of views and structures. I think they were the only structure that was connected by the fact that they all, at one point, worked for former intelligence services, regardless of what they were called, from 1945 to the free general elections. They all have that in common, from those leaders who chose to leave to those who will follow them. I do not want to speculate about that, but there is a possibility that they will resort to some kind of blackmail or something else. Regardless of what we may think, Manolic was one of the most responsible officials in our time, as well. If the system of a law-ordered state failed at the Ministry of Defense or some other ministry, why did he not react then? That is odd. He had the opportunity to call us to account for what happened and he could even dismiss us. I find it odd that he chose to do that now. That should tell us much about his intentions. As for their holding us accountable, I would like to see both Manolic and Mesic present concrete examples and substantiate their accusations.

[Pudja] Manolic's group also blames the Croatian leadership and you personally for the conflict between the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Susak] I think that what Manolic reproaches us for is the least important factor in the conflict between the Croats and the Muslims. If he had cared about interests of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he would have taken concrete steps in the past three to four years and done something himself, both publicly and secretly. There had to be much secret work in order to organize the local Croat population and defend the territory where they live. I think the fact of the matter is something completely different. They say we are to blame, that those conflicts were caused by Croatian state politics, but my only reply is that the Croatian state leadership and the leaders of the HDZ—and I am one of them—have been consistent in implementing our policies toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the moment Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized to the referendum and acceptance of all proposals of the international community. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats and their leadership were the only one of the three nations to have accepted all proposals of the international community in order to establish peace. We could not have implemented that on our own, for it takes at least two sides to reach an agreement. The conflict between the Croats and the Muslims, which unfortunately broke out, was not in the interest of Croatia, nor in the interest of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats. It was against our interests and that is why Croatia cannot be blamed. That does not justify mistakes that happened on lower levels among the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, our policies have been consistent from day one and we are prepared to render an account of our implementation of such policies.

The Example of Konjic

[Pudja] You also said that the first shipment of weapons from Croatia went to Foca.

[Susak] Yes. The first shipment did go to Foca thanks to a local Muslim representative. Unfortunately, they lost Foca, not because they had no desire to defend it, but because they did not receive support from where they were supposed to get it. That does not mean that, given that support, they could have defended it, but during the most critical moments, the Bosnian leadership did not realize how serious the situation was. I do not mean this as a criticism, we all made mistakes, but this is a fragment that must also be considered in analyzing the events of the past two and a half years. One cannot blame the policies of one side or the other for the conflict between the Croats and the Muslims. As a result of the Serb aggression, several thousand refugees were forced into a small area where it was impossible to live and that is why there were misunderstandings. Very often the official Bosnia-Herzegovina leadership failed in the most crucial moments. Afterwards, they tried, and are still trying, to make up for that, but that is another matter. That will not justify the first days when they were not up to the moment and when we could not find partners in the Bosnia-Herzegovina leadership to organize a more effective defense together. Their dilemma was whether to ask the "Yugoslav Army to defend them from the Chetniks." However, when that army showed its true colors there as well, it was too late to do anything efficiently. Unlike their leaders, some Muslim individuals realized what was the essential problem and came directly to Zagreb for help. That is why we sent those weapons to Foca.

[Pudja] The Croats were accused of being responsible for those conflicts at the Bosnia-Herzegovina assembly in Sarajevo as well.

[Susak] Those were isolated examples. Prime Minister Silajdzic said that himself. The Croats cannot be blamed for that tragic conflict. The Muslims could not have gotten their first weapons from anywhere else but from Croatia or from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats against whom they used them. I repeat, there were mistakes at lower levels and in some Bosnia-Herzegovina Croat structures. We have documented the case of Konjic, where the ratio of Croats and Muslims is less favorable. The first shipment of weapons from Croatia that got to Konjic was divided equally among the Croats and the Muslims. The Muslims abused that and seized power in Konjic using weapons they got from the Croats. The cases of Bugojno, Travnik, and other towns are well-documented too. In a nutshell, the enemy of the Croats

in Bosnia-Herzegovina was far too recognizable and powerful for the Croats to reach for another enemy.

Investigation Into Sesvete

[Pudja] Your political opponents also say you are responsible for the explosion in Duboki Jarak [a suburb of Zagreb]. They think you should be held accountable as the defense minister.

[Susak] The defense minister would, in normal procedures and conditions, have to be responsible for what happened in Duboki Jarak. However, there has been much misinformation in the public and two items are very important. Firstly, at the time of the accident I was away on business in Mostar. I was informed about the accident at about 1430 and I reported to the supreme commander and the president of the Republic at about 1900. Newspapers say I came one day later, which is not true. I will not reveal what the president and I talked about. I was prepared to resign. In normal circumstances, I take the political responsibility regardless of the facts. However, President Tudjman, who appointed me defense minister, thought I should not resign. It is common knowledge that a defense minister does not hand in his resignation to the parliament, but to President Tudjman, and it is up to the parliament to analyze all the events and form their opinion about me in a regular procedure.

[Pudja] With regard to what happened in Sesvete, you personally suggested to bring in commissions from abroad.

[Susak] It would be irresponsible of me if I did not get several opinions about the explosion. At the meeting with President Tudjman, in addition to the commission of the Defense Ministry which was appointed by the president personally, I requested to send for another independent commission from abroad. At the same time, we filed a request with NATO and France. The French contacted us first and we accepted their commission. NATO, which contacted us later, offered to send a group that would help us destroy leftover bombs which did not explode, and we accepted. Those commissions will soon submit their reports to appropriate organs, which will then decide about who is responsible for the explosion.

[Pudja] Can you, perhaps, tell us when will those reports be made public?

[Susak] I think the commissions will finish their job within the next two weeks. First results could be expected even sooner. All things considered, the results will be presented to the public and for discussion in the parliament in the next two weeks. There is no way I can influence the work of those commissions and their results. You know that the Ministry of Justice appointed a judge who gives entrance and exit permissions to all commissions.

[Pudja] Are there any indications as to the cause of the explosion?

[Susak] I would not like to speculate about that at this point. It would not be good for the work of the commissions. Journalists and analysts can afford to speculate, but a defense minister cannot.

Spegelj's Slander

[Pudja] In spite of various expectations about the respectability of the Croatian Army and about the situation regarding the military industry of Croatia, you were the one who spoke about that the least.

[Susak] You are here to ask questions, and I am here to answer them. I would not like to discuss the respectability of the Croatian Army at present. That is up to military experts to say. In public, we hear both views. However, the most surprising thing is that former defense minister and commander of the Supreme Headquarters General Spegelj says that the Defense Ministry and Supreme Headquarters are mostly composed of people who are not trained for their jobs. I do not know to whom he refers, perhaps General Bobetko or somebody else. Professional skill is assessed by means of comparison. I, as the defense minister, can be reproached for not being a soldier. I think this ministry is just like any other ministry. My role is to find the best possible personnel and means in order to make the system work. I think it is in the interest of Croatia that a civilian, regardless of who it may be, be at the head of the Defense Ministry, for we do not want Croatia to be a military state, but a democratic country. The Army is just one of the factors which protects and establishes the system of the state. Whether, in the past two and a half years, I justified the confidence of the president of the Republic and of the prime ministers, that is up to them and to the Croatian people to deduce on the basis of unbiased analyses. They should look into the state of the Croatian Army when I took office, into circumstances regarding the acquisition of its equipment, into the state of Croatian military industry, and compare the responsibility of the Croatian Army then and at present. Let me remind you, when I became defense minister, an arms embargo was already imposed on Croatia.

[Pudja] People think that the Croatian Army can regain the remaining part of the occupied territory of Croatia. So far, we have been trying to regain that territory and include it in the system of Croatia in a peaceful manner. Will that be the case from now on as well?

[Susak] According to estimates and reports of not only those who are in charge of that in our ministry, but also of other reports, the Croatian Army can liberate the entire Croatian territory, by force if necessary. But I would like to repeat what our president said: The first task of our state politics is to reach our goal with minimum casualties. However, if we are forced to resort to force, if there is no way out, we are prepared to do that and liberate our territory.

[Box, p 6]

Accusation

[Susak] Manolic's statement that I stepped in and arranged the release of a certain colonel of the Information and Security Service, and that he was smuggling drugs, is an accusation that deserves to go to court. Both the Justice Ministry and the Ministry of Interior and their ministers have publicly denied those accusations. If I were doing something else and if I had the time, I would immediately begin legal action against Joza Manolic.

[Box, p 7]

Emigration and the Croatian Independent Democrats

[Susak] The Croatian Independent Democrats would like to spread some information about emigration and the names of people who allegedly want to join their party. I think the emigration will commit themselves on that. Manolic and Mesic have only a handful of emigrants' names—I say names, for those are obviously not people. As to the question why there are so many emigrants, that should be answered by Mr. Manolic, who had a very important function at the time when a large number of Croats were forced to leave their homes.

[Box, p 7]

Christian Morality

[Susak] We, members of the HDZ, do not advocate a clericalist party, as Mr. Duka and Mr. Juric say; rather, we advocate what every party of that orientation in Western democracy wants—to build the state on Christian morality. On the basis of that and as a national party we want—as long as we enjoy the confidence of the Croatian nation—to create the Croatian state.

[Box, p 7]

Care

[Susak] Caring for disabled veterans and families of soldiers who died defending our country is the duty of the entire Croatian state. At the latest session of the government, I proposed that a session be dedicated exclusively to problems of wounded soldiers and families of dead soldiers, and the proposal was unanimously accepted. Within our means, the Defense Ministry will make a concrete step toward solving at least those initial problems with accommodation. I will propose that housing funds be established in every county and that loans be provided for those who could solve their housing problems. I think that, if we continue with our present budget policy and with this government, we will be able to solve that part of the problem.

Commentary Views Problems in Forming Federation

AU0405185294 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 26 Apr 94 p 10

[Commentary by Mario Marusic: "Federation Hanging in the Balance"]

[Text] Mostar (from VJESNIK's staff correspondent)—At present, the key question in relations between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats and Bosniaks is the election of the president and prime minister. The question has not been solved even after the latest round of negotiations in Sarajevo, although both sides presented legal and political arguments in favor of their representative, Bosniak or Croat, respectively. Since the matter will not be resolved even after the 30-day deadline for the elections stipulated by the Constitution, this could cut deeply into future negotiations and significantly influence the (non)implementation of the Washington Agreement, that is, of what was agreed in Sarajevo. Regardless of that, Kresimir Zubak and Haris Silajdzic both said the Sarajevo negotiations had been "extremely constructive and positive."

The Question of Outvoting

The reason behind Zubak's and Silajdzic's optimism is, first of all, the successful negotiations on the organization of the future federal government. It was agreed that, in the period that follows, the reconstructed government shall act both as the Bosniak and the federal government and that it will be composed of 12 department ministers and another three members, one of whom would be the president of the Federation (although they still have not agreed on which departments would be run by Croats and which by Bosniaks). Furthermore, the heads of both delegations said that they were well satisfied with the progress of the negotiations about economic and humanitarian questions. However, it would be difficult to speak about progress in Croat-Bosniak relations until the most important problems that are crucial for the future federation are solved.

As for the "crucial" arguments about the election of the president and the prime minister, reliable sources report that, in spite of diplomatic words like "constructiveness," with regard to some problems, the Bosniak-Muslim side will not relinquish principles that in no way promote the spirit of the Washington Agreement. Quite the contrary, they keep saying that the Bosniaks are "the most populous" nation and that "most victims in this war have been Bosniaks." If such is the case, it will be very difficult to reach a mutually satisfactory solution and form (any kind of) federation. Perhaps this is a bit too pessimistic a statement, but insisting on the fact that one nation is in the majority (while the Washington agreement speaks only about equal, constituent, and sovereign nations) is evidence of a stubborn streak in sticking to views which are usually present with regard to a civic, that is, unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, which the Muslim-Bosniak leaders have advocated all the time and

which has been the bone of contention in relations between the two nations. Therefore, it does not make much sense to repeat something like that after Washington. The question of outvoting, which was thought to be history after adopting the Constitution of the Federation, seems to have reappeared and is reaching its desired goal, which was one of the main causes of the Croat-Muslim conflict.

President for Life

Moreover, concern over the (too) slow implementation of the agreement is amplified by the fact that the Bosniak-Muslim side is relentless in waging a media war, and Sarajevo Radio and the Mostar "War Studio" are cases in point. The specially established UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] commission had many complaints with regard to that. In the eyes of the Bosniak-Muslim media, Alija Izetbegovic is still the (only possible) president (of the federation as well), and he gets most support from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Its corps and brigades simply compete in giving public support to Izetbegovic, who could enjoy a full five years of the presidency with a one-year mandate only. Evidently, there is a preponderance of his followers among the Sarajevo leadership and, as opposed to the "reconcilable" Silajdzic, Izetbegovic wants both leading positions in the future Federation, probably thinking that they can form a federation "with themselves." It is high time that Sarajevo realized that their political partners are legally elected representatives of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that they must reach a democratic agreement on everything. For, if there is a lack of will to do this (and the Bosniaks have not proven themselves prepared for this so far), the entire project of the joint Federation may fall through, which can lead to (another) situation that is difficult to solve, especially as the third side (the Bosnian Serbs) are again militarily active on all the fronts trying to cause complete chaos in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Federal

UK's Hogg Meets Serbian Leaders in Belgrade

Hogg Presents Peace Plan

LD0405174694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1618 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, 4 May (TANJUG)—Douglas Hogg, the minister of state at the Foreign Office, said in Belgrade today that a plan for a comprehensive peace solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be based on a proposal for the territorial division advocated by the European Union. I have not come to Belgrade with any specific plan, but I brought two important messages, Hogg said after his meetings with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic. Hogg specified that the first message was that it was of vital importance to cease hostilities as soon as possible. The second message is that it is necessary to realize that a comprehensive peace solution in Bosnia is based on a division of the country, giving 51 percent of the territory to the Muslim-Croat federation. Hogg stressed that the sanctions will not be relaxed until the war stops and the peace plan begins to be implemented in Bosnia. He confirmed that he had discussed with Milosevic and Jovanovic the problem of the UN protected areas in Croatia, but he did not specify what they talked about.

As regards the fresh crisis surrounding Brcko and the latest attempts to create an exclusion zone there as well, Hogg said that this subject had not been discussed because these talks did not involve any details. He stressed that he agreed with the increase in the number of UN observers in that area, which the Serb side had agreed to as well.

Yugoslav Minister Jovanovic explained that the stance on the division of Bosnia that Hogg had mentioned was in fact an old EU proposal, which Britain believes should be a framework for demarcation in the resumed negotiations. This is not a problem that should be obstructing the negotiating process and the ending of the war at this moment, he underlined. We agreed that the work of the contact group is very important and that it is necessary to sign an agreement on the cessation of hostilities as soon as possible, which should be followed by political negotiations, Jovanovic said.

What the Yugoslav side insists on, according to him, is that the sanctions, as an acute problem, are the basic obstacle to the implementation of any political solution either in Bosnia or in Krajina, or, for that matter, the entire territory of Yugoslavia. We pointed out that the sanctions are a form of hostility against the entire Serbian nation, not only against us in Yugoslavia, and that before the cessation of hostilities, due attention ought to be paid to ending all other forms of hostility. The sanctions are one of them, as well as the media war and the biased approach of the international community to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Yugoslav crisis in general. It would be impossible to cease military hostilities while keeping economic, propaganda and other forms in force.

Jovanovic told the reporters that Hogg's visit was part of the British Government's initiative aimed at "assessing the situation" for the work of the contact group which is preparing a new peace conference. Hogg conveyed to us the assurances that the British Government and probably other Western governments were not prepared to fight the war for the Muslims against anybody. We do not have any reason to doubt this, even though the development of the situation will be the best proof for this, Jovanovic said.

The assessment of the situation should be carried out before the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina is signed. The interested parties, i.e. representatives of the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] mediation, will hold further talks to discuss whether the agreement will be of limited duration or a permanent one, Jovanovic pointed out.

According to Jovanovic, Kosovo was also discussed in the context of an overall political solution in the former Yugoslavia, and after visiting Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade, Hogg will visit Pristina and it is very likely that he will go to Zagreb again.

Milosevic Receives Hogg

LD0405150394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1415 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, 4 May (TANJUG)—Serb President Slobodan Milosevic has received Douglas Hogg, the minister of state in the British Foreign Office, who arrived in our country today.

President Milosevic said there was no real chance of the international community playing a positive role in the Yugoslav crisis as long as it failed to face the truth, as long as it accused Serbia of the aggression, as long as it fueled fundamentalism, and as long as it continued sanctions against the Serbian people in flagrant contravention of the UN Charter. By accepting the EU's proposals, the Serbian side has demonstrated its commitment to peace. It has transpired that the war is being waged by those forces that instigate the Muslim side into armed conflicts, something that is undoubtedly to their detriment and claims a large number of casualties. It is obvious that the policy of pressures and threats has resulted in total fiasco and that a peace process, whereby all warring parties are treated equally and the international community is impartial, is the quickest way to peace, a normalization of the situation, and a just political solution to the crisis.

President Slobodan Milosevic pointed out that the continuation of economic sanctions against our country was counterproductive, as they represent an obstacle to the

restoration of peace. This is why the international community ought to abolish them.

It was stressed during the talks that the international community should exert strong influence to discourage and thwart the proponents of the war option and that it should be decisive in stopping Muslim armed provocations and offensives against the Serbs side to stop the war from escalating and to prevent further destablization in the region.

Serbia favors an agreement on a permanent end to hostilities on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina through an unbiased involvement of the UN peace forces. For this reason, the efforts to restart the negotiating process are the international community's priority task. The republic of Serbia will continue to favor negotiations as a way of resolving the crisis and will insist that the peace process cannot be developed through the use of force but rather through equal respect for the interests of all three sides.

The Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs, Vladislav Jovanovic, also took part in the talks.

Karadzic on Meeting

LD0405190894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1739 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, 4 May (TANJUG)—We are ready to cooperate with the contact group and to negotiate on a political solution, but we will not attend a new conference on Bosnia unless the sanctions are lifted; that is, we cannot accept negotiations under unequal conditions, Radovan Karadzic, the president of the republic of Srpska, told TANJUG today after his meeting with Douglas Hogg, minister of state at the British foreign office in Belgrade.

The international community must say clearly whether it considers it more important to restore peace or to keep the sanctions in place, Karadzic said. If it is more important to the international community to keep the sanctions, then their main aim is to exhaust the Serbs economically, militarily, and politically, and not to restore peace.

The talks, which lasted about one and a half hours at the British residence [in Belgrade], were also attended by republic of Srpska vice president Nikola Koljevic, assembly chairman Momcilo Krajisnik, and Bosnian Serb foreign minister Aleksa Buha. According to Karadzic, they discussed the possibilities of reaching an agreement on a cessation of hostilities and an overall political settlement, as well as on the current situation in Gorazde and Brcko.

Karadzic said that the Serb side was ready to cooperate with the contact group if the group was preparing a new conference on Bosnia, adding that he would have a meeting with them tomorrow, but he expressed doubt as to whether the group had enough authority and could adopt a more flexible stance. Asked if there was a fresh approach to the conference, Karadzic said that the new joint standpoint of the international community was still undefined. If one listens to Kinkel, one could see that the international community, above all the European states, are not united regarding the solution to the Yugoslav crisis, Karadzic said.

The international community, as Karadzic said, has to abandon the concept of defining the territories by percentages. Percentages are meaningless. We are prepared to give five percent of the [Bosnian] territory for the urban core of Sarajevo, which amounts to half a percent. That is why we propose talks on the viability of two new states, Karadzic pointed out.

He reiterated that the Serbs wanted their state and that in the name of peace they were prepared to make such a territorial deal that would ensure the viability, i.e. the economic and military defensive capacity of their own [Bosnian Serb] state's borders as well as the borders of the Muslim-Croat federation. According to Karadzic, the issue that is unacceptable to the Serb side is bringing the Serb corridor, i.e. Posavina [northern Bosnia], into question.

Stressing that the corridor is a vital issue for the Serbs because of the encirclement [Serbs in Krajina and Bosnia are encircled by Muslims and Croats] and defense of the borders, Karadzic reiterated: We will not accept any changes in Brcko's status but we fully accept a cessation of all hostilities and we have offered the Muslims a cease-fire in the Brcko area. If the Muslims do not accept, the Serbs will proclaim a unilateral cessation of hostilities and will not respond to the attacks except in the case if they were really endangered. UN monitors will be able to make their own judgements in such cases.

The talks with Hogg, as Karadzic said, clarified the Brcko situation, while it had been agreed in yesterday's talks with UN envoy Akashi that three to four observer teams be stationed on the Serb side in the vicinity of that town in order to report accurately to the international community on who was carrying out offensive operations. Asked what the objective of the attempts to adopt a new UN resolution on the creation of an exclusion zone around Brcko precisely at a time when preparations were under way for a new conference on Bosnia was, Karadzic replied: All this is aimed at exerting pressure on the Serbs.

If we correctly view the creation of an exclusion zone around Brcko, this would mean that the Muslims and Croats would have to withdraw their heavy guns to a distance of 20 km from that town. However, we have been in Brcko since the beginning of the war. Life is going on normally there, schools are open, stores as well, and the frontline is far away, Karadzic explained.

There is no need to create an exclusion zone around Brcko because the Serbs are not asking for anyone's protection, he added. But if someone believes that the proclamation of an exclusion zone would imply that the Serbs would have to leave Brcko, they should know that

this will not happen and that we will defend our right in the corridor at all costs, to the last Serb in the republic of Srpska.

As far as Gorazde is concerned, Karadzic believes that the crisis is over but that the only sensitive issue now is the safety of Serbian civilians. This should be resolved through the presence of the Serbian police, working in close collaboration with and under the supervision of the United Nations. There will be no other Serb forces in the agreed three km radius, and this should also apply to the Muslims, the republic of Srpska president emphasized.

Jovanovic Meets With Hogg

AU0405194094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 4 May 94

[Report by Jelena Radovanov on a news conference by Vladislav Jovanovic after talks with Douglas Hogg, minister of state at the British Foreign Office, in Belgrade on 4 May—recorded]

[Text] [Radovanov] Assessing today's talks with President Milosevic, Douglas Hogg said that they spoke about very important aspects of the crisis in Bosnia and proposals to halt the armed clashes, as well as proposals for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Bosnia. We also discussed the UNPA [UN Protected Areas] in Croatia, Mr. Hogg said. We did not discuss Brcko, since our talks did not go into details. I agree with increasing the number of military observers in the northern part of Bosnia, Hogg said. I did not arrive with a concrete plan, he said, but I did come with two important messages. The first one is the vital importance of an unconditional cease-fire, and the other one is the recognition of the importance of an overall peace solution for Bosnia, to be based on the partition of the territory on the basis of 49 percent to 51 percent. As you know, this has been under discussion, Hogg said. Hogg also said that there would be no alleviation of the sanctions until the war was over and until the peace plan was implemented.

This is how FRY Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic assessed the talks between Douglas Hogg and President Milosevic:

[Jovanovic] You see, these talks referred to the topics that Mr. Hogg mentioned, that is, the situation in Bosnia and the negotiations with Krajina, and the situation in Kosovo was also mentioned. We focused on the most current issues. The minister has already mentioned that it was the work of the contact group that was the most important, then the need to conclude an agreement on the cease-fire. We also discussed the great need and the common interest in negotiations for a political solution. We agreed that the work of the contact group was very important and that there was a need for an immediate cessation of hostilities. The political negotiations have to follow immediately afterwards. There was not much talk about details. Mr. Hogg mentioned that there was a need for a 51 percent to 49 percent division. That is not a problem that should halt negotiations and the cease-fire at the moment.

On the other hand, we pointed to the problem of the sanctions that are an absolute problem, which are not only the generator of the crisis and other problems but also a main obstacle to the implementation of any political solution, be it for Bosnia or Krajina, or the Yugoslav space in general. We found the common ground there that it was vital to remove obstacles on one party to the implementation of the future political solution. However, we could not discuss when and how, because as the minister pointed out, the common stand of the Western countries is that for the time being—until the peace agreement is reached on Bosnia-Herzegovina—there can be no talk about the lifting of the sanctions.

However, we pointed out that the sanctions were a form of hostilities that relate to the entire Serbian nations, not just to us in Yugoslavia, and that parallel to the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina it was necessary to refer to the need to end other forms of hostilities. The sanctions are one of these. The media war and the one-sided approach by the international community to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Yugoslav crisis in general is another form of hostility. It is impossible to stop military hostilities and maintain the economic and propaganda pressure, as well as psychological and other forms of hostilities.

We believe that after these talks that all those who are interested in peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the crisis in Yugoslavia will better understand the need for one revised approach to the Bosnian and the Yugoslav crisis—which is to remove the unequal treatment of the participants in the Yugoslav crisis, and particularly the biased approach—that this would provide a quick movement forward toward peace and the stabilization of the entire situation in the Balkans.

Hogg Comments on Kosovo

LD0505114094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1103 GMT 5 May 94

[Text] Pristina, 5 May (TANJUG)—Douglas Hogg, minister of state in the UK Foreign Office, said in Pristina today that both the British Government and the international community are of the view that the issue of the rights of Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija will have to be resolved within the borders of Serbia. I wish to say that Kosovo is part of Serbia and we do not believe that the borders should be changed. We also think that there is no need for an independent state on the territory of Kosovo, Douglas Hogg told journalists, following his talks with Milos Savovic, governor [nacelnik] of the Kosovo district. The main tasks are to find ways of implementing the political, cultural, and civil rights of the Albanian community in Kosovo and to allow the Albanians to play a full role in political and administrative life, Hogg said.

The British minister of state continued his visit by talking to ethnic Albanian representatives in Pristina.

TANJUG Criticizes Clinton Comments on B-H

LD0405130094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1042 GMT 4 Apr 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Washington, May 4 (TANJUG)—U.S. President Bill Clinton said on Tuesday evening he wanted the warring sides in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to return to the negotiating table, reach peace and establish normal peaceful relations. He said he also wanted such relations with Serbia but added that it had to be done in a correct and moral way. He made the statement at an annual rally at the headquarters of the CNN television network in Atlanta which was devoted to foreign policy issues.

Clinton declined, however, to give a straight answer to the question put by a Yugoslav journalist on whether the time had come to start treating equally all parties to the Bosnian conflict (Moslems, Serbs and Croats) and stop threatening the Serbs alone. The U.S. President said he was not inclined to the lifting of the U.N. sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) and added, as an argument, that Serbia had allegedly violated the U.N. embargo on arms deliveries and had been arming the Bosnian Serbs.

Serbia sends to the Bosnian Serbs only humanitarian supplies which include food, medicaments and clothes, while the U.N. arms embargo is being violated by the he former Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, which are directly arming Bosnian Croats and Moslems and allowing the Islamic and some western countries to smuggle arms into Bosnia-Herzegovina through their territories.

Clinton said he agreed that there could be no military solution to the Bosnian conflict and, in corroboration of the view, mentioned a Serb attempt to "gain advantage" in the eastern Moslem enclave of Gorazde. He overlooked the fact that Gorazde—a U.N.-designated "safe area" which should have been demilitarised last spring—had been abused by the Bosnian Moslems and used as a military stronghold for launching an offensive on Serb territories late in March.

When the Serb side launched a counter-attack and the Moslems faced a total defeat, U.S. NATO warplanes bombed Serb positions around the town on April 10 and 11. Clinton said that the U.S. was trying to use NATO's air force to protect "safe areas" but that the chief objective was the return to the negotiating table. He stressed that the U.S. did not want to get involved in the Bosnian war on the Moslem side either alone or through NATO.

Clinton said the U.S. Administration had conveyed to the Bosnian Moslem [word indistinct] that it could not expect support from the U.S. to change the military balance of forces and that a peaceful settlement was the only solution.

Belgrade Protests Berisha Speech in Sofia

LD0405164094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1558 GMT 4 May 94

[Text] Sofia, 4 May (TANJUG)—Rados Smiljkovic, the ambassador of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Sofia [name and title as received], today lodged a protest with the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry in reaction to a speech delivered by Albanian President Sali Berisha in the Bulgarian National Assembly when he attacked the FRY, Serbia, and the Serbian people in the harshest of terms. Such an anti-Serbian attitude displayed by the Albanian president raises the issue of responsibility borne by the hosts for this verbal assault on the FRY in the highest institution of Bulgarian democracy, the protest underlines.

We express our deepest regret at the fact that such a possibility was granted to a man well known for his advocacy of the war option in the Balkans, a man who is voluntarily offering everybody—primarily Turkey—bases and strongholds for military operations against the FRY, it is said in the protest.

The Albanian president is disseminating lies about the creation of a Greater Serbia in order to conceal his own program for the creation of a Greater Albania, which, besides Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija], would include western Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and parts of Montenegro. According to the protest, the most glaring untruths in Berisha's speech in the Bulgarian Assembly related to Kosmet, because, it is said, the Albanian population there neither numbers two million nor has their autonomy been abolished.

Bank Chairman: Hard Currency Reserves on Increase

LD0405220894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1312 GMT 4 May 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 4 May (TANJUG)—As of 24 July, there will be no budget deficit thanks to the speed at which our taxation system is recovering. Such hopes are not groundless given the stable position of the dinar and stagnant prices, Dragoslav Avramovic, the governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, said today at the "TANJUG's Guest" panel.

Hard currency reserves have gone up by about 450 million German marks in the past 100-odd days. One third of this amount has been earmarked for the importation of necessities and what is missing on the market. These goods, Avramovic says, will arrive soon, thus changing the ratio of supply and demand.

"Instead of reducing the hard currency reserves we have registered their increase, something that confirms our

belief that the best way has been chosen in these difficult circumstances. In spite of the severe embargo we are outmaneuvering the unprecedented and unjust sanctions by relying on our creativity.

"There is no reason whatever to devalue the dinar. Production is on the rise while every issued dinar is covered by hard currency or goods. [passage omitted] Despite predictions, when sanctions are lifted, Avramovic believes, our position will not be untenable because we will have a great deal to offer to the world market—textiles, footwear, meat, and all the other goods that proved successful abroad in the past.

"We have done everything possible in today's circumstances to facilitate the country's speedy recovery. We started with a 200 million U.S. dollar hard currency reserve with the provision that the National Bank of Yugoslavia could borrow 300 million U.S. dollars. This, in addition to the measures of fiscal policy and eliminating the budget deficit, will be yet another impetus for reviving production, public works, and suchlike." [passage omitted]

The initial successes in curbing the rate of inflation and our economic difficulties have already impressed the world, the blockade has practically been breached. These days it is evident that foreign reporters are constantly interested in our present and future moves, Avramovic said.

Of course, not all our problems have been solved. The key remains—a strong dinar based on the recovery of the economy. Some things, such as development plans and others, disappeared from our practices in the past. Some of these institutions, Avramovic maintains, should be reintroduced and we should proceed along the conventional path. We should not fear credits geared to the reviving of production, particularly so if their price is realistic. This in itself obliterates the fear of increased production being stranded in an allegedly small market.

The National Bank governor categorically says that a large number of products would find their niche in the market, even in today's circumstances, and even more so if national income goes up by 100 percent in a certain period of time. "For example, of the 1.5 million cars on our roads at least half of them should be replaced because of their age. This is enough to keep Zastava [automobile producer] busy for another 10 years." [passage omitted]